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THE SECOND AMENDMENT UNDER A 
GOVERNMENT LANDLORD:  IS THERE A 
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR LEGAL 
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING? 
JAMIE L. WERSHBALE† 
INTRODUCTION 
There is substantial controversy over the status and scope of 
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
otherwise known as the “right to bear arms.”1  While it is clear 
there is no absolute right to gun ownership, what rights 
Americans do have, to possess firearms in their homes or 
elsewhere, is not entirely settled.  This constitutional quagmire is 
a source of heated debate between gun control advocates and gun 
rights supporters.   
The 2008 United States Supreme Court decision in District 
of Columbia v. Heller2 shed light on the status of gun ownership 
in America, articulating a federal individual right to bear arms 
unconnected to militia participation.3  Further illuminating the 
rights of gun owners in the United States, the subsequent 2010 
decision in McDonald v. Chicago4 answered the open question of 
whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to the states:  
The Court held “that the Second Amendment right is fully  
 
 
 
† Attorney-Advisor, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development; J.D., 2009, Florida Coastal School of Law; B.S., 2005, Indiana 
University.  Disclaimer:  The views expressed in this Article are entirely those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the agency or the United 
States.  
1 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”). 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
3 Id. at 2797. 
4 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010) 
996 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:995   
applicable to the States.”5  However, despite the outcome in 
McDonald, firearm regulation will remain an issue of controversy 
and the focus of much litigation. 
The question of gun ownership becomes further clouded in 
the context of conventional public housing.  Public housing 
consists of government-owned housing facilities, which shelter 
low- and very low-income tenants at significantly reduced rents.6  
Taxpayers support public housing at a cost of $11 billion 
annually.7  Funds appropriated to the United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), a Cabinet-level 
federal agency, are formulaically allocated to local public housing 
authorities (“PHAs”) to establish, maintain, and operate public 
housing developments.8  In public housing, the government is the 
landlord. 
There are strong bases both for and against permitting legal 
firearm possession in public housing.  Statistical and anecdotal 
evidence of high incidences of gun-related violent crime in 
housing projects supports prohibition of all firearms in public 
housing.  Constituents’ stereotyping all public housing as 
dangerous and dilapidated also favors public housing firearm 
bans.9  For many Americans, the term “project” conjures up 
thoughts of places like Chicago’s violent drug-ridden Cabrini-
Green and the now-demolished Robert Taylor Homes—stories of 
tenants sleeping in bathtubs for fear of stray bullets, images of 
tightly-packed high-rise buildings overrun by gangs, and tales of 
lawless places where poor minorities are isolated from society.10   
 
 
5 Id. at 3026. 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2006 & Supp. II). 
7 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW 
OF FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HOUSING 6 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/105xx/doc10525/11-03-HousingPrograms.pdf. 
8 See id. 
9 See Harold R. Holzman et al., Revisiting the Relationship Between Crime and 
Architectural Design: An Analysis of Data from HUD’s 1994 Survey of Public 
Housing Residents, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, Feb. 1996, at 107, 121 
(“[P]ublic housing highrises may not be as criminogenic as the conventional wisdom 
would lead one to believe.”); Susan Mayer & Christopher Jencks, Editorial, War on 
Poverty: No Apologies, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A29.  
10 See Mayer & Jencks, supra note 9; cf. Madeline Howard, Subsidized Housing 
Policy: Defining the Family, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 99 (2007) 
(“[G]overnmental housing policy should go further towards promoting the 
integration of low-income housing into the larger community.”). 
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While this picture of public housing is not baseless, it is far 
from a true cross-section of public housing developments 
nationwide.11  Over two million Americans live in public 
housing,12 the majority being law-abiding citizens working to 
better their positions in life.13  Very few public housing 
developments are high-rises, let alone high-rises containing 
thousands of units like the aforementioned Chicago facilities.14  
There is truth in the common perception that poor minorities, 
particularly women with young children, populate public 
housing, but public housing also supports a significant number of 
low-income elderly and disabled persons, as well as nonminority 
families.15  Nonetheless, there are still serious concerns about 
gun violence in public housing developments, inducing many 
PHAs to ban or restrict all firearm ownership.16  However, after 
Heller, there are persuasive constitutional arguments that the 
law-abiding citizens in these developments should be permitted 
to legally possess firearms for defense of hearth and home, 
despite government ownership of the units. 
This Article examines the right to bear arms under a 
residential government landlord, collecting legal scholarship and 
decisional law as a guide for future litigation efforts and public 
housing policy in the aftermath of Heller and McDonald.  Part I 
overviews public housing in the United States.  Part II concisely 
presents the Second Amendment, focusing on the holding in 
Heller and discusses incorporation under McDonald.  Part III 
 
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (2006) (stating congressional findings regarding drugs 
and drug-related crime in public housing); JESSE MCKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002, at 6 (2003), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-541.pdf; Holzman et al., supra note 9; 
Norm Parish, Public Housing Study: Negative Stereotypes Fail To Hold Up, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 2002, at B5. 
12 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO 
PUBLIC HOUSING 1 (2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY], available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-housing.pdf. 
13 See, e.g., Regina Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor 
Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 288 (2002) (“There are enormous numbers of poor 
minority people trapped in desperate economic circumstances who do not resort to 
criminal behavior and violence.”). 
14 PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12. 
15 MCKINNON, supra note 11, at 7; Howard, supra note 10, at 97 (“Families 
headed by single women of color now predominate in subsidized housing.”); Michael 
A. Stegman, The Fall and Rise of Public Housing, REGULATION, Summer 2002, at 
64, 68. 
16 See infra Part I.B. 
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discusses the state of the law leading up through Heller, as well 
as HUD policies and congressional inclinations regarding 
firearms in public housing.  Part IV explores the post-Heller 
constitutionality of firearms in public housing.  This Part 
considers potential outcomes after McDonald, including the 
validity of a federal laws, the application of state laws, and 
challenges based on incorporation, as well as contemplating 
issues relevant to the right of armed self-defense.  Although 
inconclusive as to the constitutionality of banning legal firearms 
in public housing, this Article lays the framework for analyzing 
the constitutionality of such prohibitions. 
The focus is solely federally-subsidized, state-owned public 
housing developments—often referenced as “conventional” or 
“traditional” public housing—where the government serves as 
landlord.  While arguably germane, public university 
dormitories, military lodgings, prisons, and Indian housing are 
beyond the scope of this Article.17   
I. PUBLIC HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Public housing does not account for a substantial portion of 
housing in the United States.  Nationwide, there is an inventory 
of only 1.16 million units located in fourteen thousand 
developments.18  Nonetheless, public housing is a key component 
of federal affordable housing policy.  Federally authorized and 
state created, public housing is implemented and run by local 
governmental entities known as PHAs.  There are more than 
three thousand PHAs in the United States, sheltering more than 
one million households in public housing.19  The following Section 
overviews public housing and describes the gun-related violence 
that has been the impetus for public housing firearm bans. 
 
17 School dormitories, military lodgings, and prisons are forms of government 
housing incidental to an overriding pedagogical, militaristic, or penological interest, 
respectively. HUD-administered Indian programs provide low-income housing funds 
directly to tribal sovereigns but principally recognize the right of tribal self-
governance. See 25 U.S.C. § 4101(7) (2006 & Supp. II). 
18 PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 1, 6. 
19 See id. at 2, 5 (approximating 3100 PHAs and 1.04 million households); U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD’s Public Housing Program, 
http://www.hud.gov/renting/phprog.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (approximating 
3300 PHAs and 1.2 million households). 
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A. An Overview of Public Housing 
The Housing Act of 193720 created public housing as part of 
“the first large-scale low-income housing program established by 
the federal government.”21  The program was a direct result of 
the Great Depression and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal legislation.22  At the federal level, public housing 
programs are presently under HUD authority.23 
HUD administers a diverse range of housing initiatives 
nationwide, public housing being only one of many different 
affordable housing and urban development programs.24  A 
combination of HUD programs provide federal funding to 
regional and local PHAs, making possible the opportunity for 
low- and very low-income families25 to live in affordable and 
decent housing.26  PHAs are the entities ultimately responsible 
for operating public housing developments, in addition to 
administering rental assistance programs for private housing.  
One such program is called Housing Choice Vouchers (“HCV”), 
formerly known as Section 8, which provides portable rental 
assistance for families to choose their own housing.27  The 
principal difference between public housing and rental assistance 
programs is that “public housing is housing for low-income 
persons that is actually government-owned,” whereas HCV and  
 
 
20 United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
21 BARRY G. JACOBS, HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT LAW 
§ 2:1 (2010).  
22 Id. § 1:3. 
23 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19.  
24 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PROGRAMS OF HUD: MAJOR 
MORTGAGE, GRANT, ASSISTANCE, AND REGULATORY PROGRAMS (2006), available at 
www.huduser.org/resources/hudprgs/ProgOfHUD06.pdf. 
25 “The term ‘low-income families’ means those families whose incomes do not 
exceed 80 per centum of the median income for the area . . . . The term ‘very low-
income families’ means low-income families whose incomes do not exceed 50 per 
centum of the median family income for the area . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (2006 
& Supp. II). “Families” includes both single persons and families with children. 
Id. § 1437a(b)(3). 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4) (2006). 
27 See id. §§ 1437f, 3535(d); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2010); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, http://www.hud.gov/offices 
/pih/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet.cfm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (“The housing 
choice voucher program is the federal government’s major program for assisting very 
low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary 
housing in the private market.”). 
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project-based rental assistance merely subsidizes privately-
owned housing.28  Simply, only tenants in public housing live 
under a governmental landlord. 
1. Public Housing Financing, Ownership, and Management 
As an arm of the federal government, HUD oversees public 
housing programs.  However, HUD does not directly own or 
control the facilities because “the Federal Government cannot 
through its direct action alone provide for the housing of every 
American citizen, or even a majority of its citizens.”29  Rather, the 
federal government seeks “to remedy unsafe housing conditions 
and the acute shortage of decent and safe dwellings for low-
income families . . . [and] to address the shortage of housing 
affordable to low-income families” by assisting states and 
political subdivisions of states financially and administratively.30  
HUD utilizes local PHAs to establish and operate publicly owned 
housing; formula-based grants directly finance capital and 
operating expenses.31 
PHAs are created under state law specifically to provide 
affordable housing for the financially disadvantaged and are 
defined as “any State, county, municipality, or other 
governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality 
thereof) which is authorized to engage in or assist in the 
development or operation of public housing.”32  HUD provides 
PHAs with technical and professional assistance in various 
aspects of planning, development, and management; primary 
control of public housing rests with the individual county and 
municipal PHAs where housing facilities are located.33  The 
federal goal is to vest PHAs with “the maximum amount of  
 
 
28 JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:3. 
29 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(2). 
30 Id. § 1437(a)(1)(A)–(B).  
31 See id. § 1437g; 24 C.F.R. § 990.100.  Formula-based grants are essentially 
allocations of funds based on a mathematical formula that considers a number of 
factors and expenses. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6)(A); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1404 (2010) 
(authorizing every city, town, and county to create a housing authority); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 421.04, .08 (West 2010) (creating a housing authority in every city). 
33 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
GUIDEBOOK app. III (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs 
/ph/rhiip/phgb_app3.pdf (documenting individual PHAs’ management policies); U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19. 
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responsibility and flexibility in program administration, with 
appropriate accountability to public housing residents, localities, 
and the general public.”34   
PHAs are responsible for day-to-day operation and 
management of public housing developments.  Functions include 
assuring lease compliance, periodically reexamining tenant 
income eligibility, and terminating leases or evicting tenants.35  
PHAs are obligated to provide public housing that is in “decent, 
safe and sanitary condition.”36  This standard applies solely to 
the physical condition of the property, including the building 
exterior, dwelling units, and health conditions, but it does not 
contemplate aesthetics or on-site violence.37  Federal law does 
require, however, PHAs to design a crime prevention plan in 
conjunction with local law enforcement.38 
There is an eligible income range for public housing, limiting 
occupancy to low- and very low-income families.39  Federal 
mandate requires that PHAs provide housing to those persons 
most in need, using a target percentage, while implementing 
“polic[ies] designed to provide for deconcentration of poverty and 
income-mixing.”40  Essentially, tenant selection policies “must 
balance certain goals, taking into account individual needs for 
low-income housing while preserving the overall purpose of 
creating socially and financially sound projects that provide a 
decent home and a suitable living environment for the tenants 
and promote economic and social diversity.”41 
These policies must be spelled out in PHA plans that are 
submitted to HUD for review and approval.42  The plans follow 
certain requirements and guidelines laid out in statutes and 
regulations, but PHAs are entrusted with the discretion to craft 
policies appropriate to each entity’s objectives, goals, 
 
34 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(C). 
35 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 19.  
36 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e)(1). 
37 See id. § 902.23; JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:118. 
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(14) (2006 & Supp. II). 
39 See id. § 1437a(a)(1); 24 C.F.R. § 960.201 (providing that at the time of initial 
occupancy only low-income families may be admitted to public housing). But see 
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(5); 24 C.F.R. § 960.503 (providing limited basis for admission of 
over-income families). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 903.2. 
41 JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:31. 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1. 
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demographics, and unique concerns.43  HUD has no hand in 
discretionary policy choices or day-to-day operations and may 
only disapprove a plan if it fails to comply with statutory 
requirements.44   
Although there is a close link with the federal government, 
PHAs act under color of state law.45  Therefore, as “state-created, 
federally-funded, locally-administered” entities, PHAs are 
“constrained to conduct their operations within the limits of the 
due process clause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”46  
Essentially, although PHAs stand as residential landlords, they 
are first and foremost the government.47 
2. Public Housing Structures and Residents 
Public housing developments have unique structural and 
demographic elements.  Physically, public housing facilities 
range from detached single-family units to large multifamily 
developments.48  Only one-third of public housing tenants live in 
buildings with fifty or more units.49  Most structures were built 
between 1950 and 1989, with the median falling nearly half a 
century ago; however, most buildings are in good physical 
condition.50  The vast majority of these buildings are located in 
metropolitan areas, with two-thirds of tenants in city centers.51  
Less than one-third of public housing tenants report  
 
 
 
43 See id. 
44 See id. § 1437c-1(i)(3). 
45 See, e.g., Kunkler v. Fort Lauderdale Hous. Auth., 764 F. Supp. 171, 174 (S.D. 
Fla. 1991). 
46 Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1002–03 (4th Cir. 1970) 
(citations omitted) (comparing public housing evictions to termination of welfare 
benefits); accord Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 Ark. AG LEXIS 352, at *2, 
*10–13 (Jul. 6, 1994). 
47 Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (stating that “[t]he 
government as landlord is still the government,” in reference to public housing in the 
federally-governed District of Columbia). 
48 OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HUD-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS IN 2003, at 19 
(2008) [hereinafter HUD RENTERS 2003], available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/ 
publications/pdf/Hud_asst_renters_report_p1.pdf. 
49 Id.  
50 PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 5; HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 
48. 
51 See HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 20. 
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“bothersome” neighborhood crime, and in comparing their prior 
accommodations to those in public housing, most tenants report 
that public housing provides a better home in a better 
neighborhood.52 
As for the residents who occupy these structures, there are 
certain types of individuals prohibited by federal law.  Before 
admitting a tenant to occupancy, PHAs must screen out persons 
with a pattern of alcohol abuse,53 those engaged in illegal drug 
use,54 persons involved in drug-related criminal activity,55 anyone 
convicted for manufacturing methamphetamine on federally-
assisted housing premises,56 and registered sex offenders.57  
Family members fitting within these categories must be excluded 
from the application or a prospective household will be denied 
admission.58 
Of the over one million occupied units, racial composition is 
fairly evenly distributed.  Approximately 52% percent of public 
housing residents are black, approximately 44% of residents are 
white; persons of Hispanic ethnicity comprise one-fifth of all 
residents.59  There are residents of all ages, with approximately 
42% of residents aged thirty-five to sixty-four years, and the 
remaining tenants evenly divided into groups aged under thirty-
five years and over sixty-five years.60  Approximately 64% of 
households have at least one family member who is elderly or 
disabled.61  Female-headed families comprise 70% of the public 
housing population, but the majority of households have no 
single children under the age of eighteen.62  Most tenants have 
some secondary education, although only 30% have earned a high  
 
 
 
 
52 Id. at 25, 27. 
53 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(b) (2010). 
54 Id. § 960.204(a)(2). 
55 Id. § 960.204(a)(1). 
56 Id. § 960.204(a)(3). 
57 Id. § 960.204(a)(4). 
58 Id. § 960.203(c)(3)(i). 
59 HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 8 (51.7% black; 43.8% white; 20.7% 
Hispanic of any race; 4.5% other races). 
60 Id. at 9 (29.5% under thirty-five years old; 42.5% aged thirty-five to sixty-four; 
28.1% over age sixty-five). 
61 PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
62 HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 12–13. 
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school diploma or equivalency, and less than one-fifth of 
residents have any postsecondary education.63  The median 
household income in 2006 was slightly less than $9,000.64   
Under the lease, tenants “have the right to exclusive use and 
occupancy of the leased unit [as a private dwelling].”65  Leases 
automatically renew and cannot be terminated except for certain 
violations or good cause.66  These rules safeguard the lease, such 
that a property interest in continued tenancy arises under 
procedural due process;67 however, there is no vested right in 
occupancy, nor an entitlement or fundamental right in public 
housing.68  Although not necessarily correlated, there are many 
long-term residents in public housing.  More than half of all 
tenants have been in their unit for at least four years, and 
approximately 16% of tenants have been in their unit for thirteen 
or more consecutive years.69  Public housing has “bec[o]me long-
term or permanent housing for [many] welfare families and 
others stuck at the bottom of the ladder.”70 
B. Firearm-Related Violence in Public Housing 
Greater than one-third of American homes contain 
firearms.71  Gun statistics establish that in 2006, there were at 
 
63 Id. (16.1% less than ninth grade; 36.6% ninth to twelth grade; 29.6% high 
school diploma or equivalency; 17.7% postsecondary education). 
64 PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12, at 2. 
65 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(d)(1), (f) (2010). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(1), (5) (2006). 
67 Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The 
government cannot deprive a private citizen of his continued tenancy, without 
affording him adequate procedural safeguards even if public housing could be 
deemed to be a privilege.” (citations omitted)). But see Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. 
Supp. 498, 503 (D.S.C. 1980) (holding tenants cannot claim substantive due process 
violations because there is no constitutional right to adequate housing, even in 
public housing developments), aff’d, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). 
68 See Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1995) (“There is no 
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where the absence of such aid means the 
loss of life, liberty or property interests that the government may not affirmatively 
deny.” (citations omitted)). 
69 HUD RENTERS 2003, supra note 48, at 10 (45% in the unit zero to three years; 
27.6% in the unit four to eight years; 11.6% in the unit nine to thirteen years; 15.8% 
in the unit longer than thirteen years). 
70 JACOBS, supra note 21, § 2:2. 
71 Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, Unintentional Shootings, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/gunviolence/gvunintentional (last visited Nov. 
21, 2010) (“Thirty-three percent of U.S. households contain a gun.” (citing PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 2009 VALUES SURVEY: FINAL 
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least 642 unintentional firearm deaths in the United States, 
12,791 firearm homicides, and 16,883 firearm suicides.72  In 2008, 
two-thirds of all homicides were committed with firearms, and 
one-half of all murders were committed with handguns.73  In 
nonhomicide offenses, firearms were used in 43.5% of all 
robberies74 and 21.4% of all aggravated assaults.75  These are 
national statistics. 
Statistics on similar incidences occurring in public housing 
are generally unavailable.  “[C]rime in public housing has yet to 
be routinely and systematically measured.”76  However, violence 
and victimization surveys reflect “higher [rates] in public housing 
compared to other contexts . . . attributed in part to drug use and 
sale.”77  Drugs impact crime in public housing by attracting non-
residents to the facilities.78   
 
TOPLINE 9 (2009), http://people-press.org/reports/questionnaires/513.pdf)); 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online 1, tbl.2.60.2008 (2008), 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2602008.pdf (reporting forty-two percent of 
Americans have a gun in their home). 
72 BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, UNITED STATES FIREARM DEATHS 
BY AGE GROUP AND INTENT: 2006 (2009), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/ 
xshare/pdf/facts/firearm-deaths-age-intent.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
73 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States: 2005, Expanded Homicide Data tbl.10, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ 
05cius/offenses/expanded_information/data/shrtable_10.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2010). 
74 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States: 2008, Robbery tbl.3, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_ 
information/data/robberytable_03.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
75 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States: 2008, Aggravated Assault tbl., http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/ 
expanded_information/data/agassaulttable.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
76 ROBERT A. HYATT & HAROLD R. HOLZMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., GUIDEBOOK FOR MEASURING CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING WITH GEOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 5 (1999), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/ 
doc/crimegis.doc. 
77 Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New 
York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 416 (2006). 
78 See, e.g., Press Release, Vice President Al Gore, Press Briefing by the Vice 
President, Secretary Henry Cisneros, Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, Attorney General 
Janet Reno, and Director of Drug Policy Lee Brown (Feb. 4, 1994), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=59790 (“[The] Connecticut 
Housing Authority reports . . . 85 percent of those arrested on public housing 
authority property do not live there.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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In 2000, HUD issued the first comprehensive report on 
firearm-related violence in PHA-owned developments.79  The 
study made significant findings and determinations, many of 
which favor banning gun possession in public housing 
developments on public policy grounds.80  As a general premise, 
the study states, “[t]here is a strong correlation between income 
and violent crime; thus the low-income population in public 
housing is especially vulnerable to gun violence.”81  The report 
estimates that persons living in government-subsidized housing 
are more than two times as likely to be victimized by gun 
violence than the rest of the population.82   
HUD compiled statistics indicate that gunshots are a major 
crime problem and that twenty-two percent of public housing 
tenants feel unsafe in their project or neighborhood.83  The study 
estimates that there are 200 unintentional firearm injuries 
annually in public housing.84  Further, on average, there was one 
gun-related homicide per day “in 66 of the Nation’s 100 largest 
public housing authorities” in 1998.85  “[I]n a larger group of more 
than 550 housing authorities, there were an estimated 296 gun-
related homicides in public housing authorities across the 
country in the first 6 months of 1999 alone.”86   
The study found no distinction between firearm violence in 
small metropolitan areas versus larger cities.  “[R]esidents of 
public housing in metro areas of less than 500,000 residents have 
the same or higher rates of gun violence victimization as public 
housing residents in larger metro areas.”87  Further, a survey of 
public housing residents indicated there was “no [discernible] 
 
79 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE IMPACT OF GUN 
VIOLENCE ON PUBLIC HOUSING COMMUNITIES 29 (2000) [hereinafter IN THE 
CROSSFIRE], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181158.pdf. 
80 See id. at 2–3. But see Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auths., CLPHA Takes Aim 
at HUD Report on Gun Violence in Public Housing, http://web.archive.org 
/web/20060929004037/http://www.clpha.org/page.cfm?pageID=361 (last visited Nov. 
21, 2010) (“Th[e] report [IN THE CROSSFIRE] is not a useful contribution because it 
relies on inadequate data and careless data analysis.”). 
81 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 14. 
82 Id. The rate of gun victimization reflected here is likely less than the actual 
rate because the statistics used did not include homicides. Id. at 40. 
83 Id. at 28. 
84 Id. at 20. 
85 Id. at 14. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 18. 
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direct relationship between the proportion of residents troubled 
by various types of crime and the size of the development.”88   
In response to the HUD report, a university criminologist 
stated, “the findings are not surprising:  ‘Housing projects tend to 
be hot spots.’  The primary reason is economics . . . .  ‘There are 
still pockets of poverty in this nation, and where you find that 
and people without a stake in the community, you’ll find some 
violence.’ ”89  Unfortunately, the “high incidence of gun-related 
violence imposes a devastating number of deaths, as well as 
injuries and physical and psychic trauma,” on those living in 
public housing developments.90  In an effort to solve these 
problems, a number of PHAs have moved to prohibit and severely 
restrict firearm possession on-site.   
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A RIGHT TO KEEP AND  
BEAR ARMS 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads, in its entirety:  “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”91  These twenty-seven words 
are the subject of much discussion in newspapers, periodicals, 
meeting halls, and courtrooms across the country, but the 
meaning and application still remains largely up for debate. 
The United States Supreme Court rarely encounters the 
Second Amendment and revisited it for the first time in nearly 
seventy years when it struck down District of Columbia gun 
control laws in Heller in 2008.  The Court held that “the District’s 
ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 
Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful 
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-
defense.”92  Essentially, the Court held that there is an individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense unassociated with 
participation in a militia, a right that was recently incorporated 
to the states under McDonald in 2010.  While the Heller decision 
 
88 Holzman et al., supra note 9, at 112. 
89 Gary Fields, Gun Risk Double in Public Housing: HUD’s Estimates on Crime 
Not Surprising, Analyst Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2000, at 3A (quoting Mike 
Rustigan, San Francisco State University criminologist). 
90 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 5.  
91 U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added). 
92 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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leaves many questions unanswered, the Court stated, “whatever 
else i[s] le[ft] to future evaluation, [the Second Amendment] 
surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”93 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: An Individual Right To Bear 
Arms 
The right to bear arms, as it is articulated in Heller directly 
and undeniably impacts the constitutionality of PHA-
implemented firearm bans in public housing.  The following 
Section concisely outlines the majority and dissenting opinions in 
this five to four United States Supreme Court decision. 
1. Heller Majority Opinion 
Framing the issue, the Heller Court considered “whether a 
District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable 
handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution.”94  The challenged statutes required residents to 
keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded, disassembled, or bound 
by a trigger lock when in the resident’s home; lawful ownership 
extended only to long guns but not handguns, due to strict 
registration requirements.95  The Heller majority unequivocally 
determined the statutes to be invalid as a functional ban on all 
handguns and firearms.96  The Court ultimately held that 
Congress could not infringe upon an individual’s right to legally 
bear firearms, unconnected to militia participation, in one’s home 
for self-defense purposes.97   
The Court came to this determination after a lengthy review 
of the language and history of the Second Amendment.98  First 
considering the meaning of the text, the Court grammatically 
seperated the two parts of the clause.  The Court determined the 
operative clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms”99—“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry 
 
93 Id. at 2821. 
94 Id. at 2787–88 (emphasis omitted). 
95 Id. at 2788. 
96 Id. at 2818. 
97 Id. at 2821–22. 
98 See id. 2788–822. 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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weapons in case of confrontation.”100  And the prefatory clause—
that is, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State”101—“announces the purpose for which the right [to 
keep and bear arms] was codified: to prevent elimination of the 
militia.”102  When putting the textual elements together, the 
Court found “that they guarantee the individual right to possess 
and carry weapons in case of confrontation”103 but not “for any 
sort of confrontation.”104  Essentially, the Second Amendment 
protects an individual, but not unlimited, right to bear arms. 
Concluding an individual right exists, the Court then turned 
to handguns as a class of firearms.105  The Court found handguns 
to be “the quintessential self-defense weapon,” implicitly 
declaring handguns instrumental to the Second Amendment 
right because self-defense is a central tenet of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence.106  The Court also determined that 
the need for self-defense is “most acute” in the protection of one’s 
self, family, and home.107  Therefore, a ban on handguns in the 
home would, “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny[,] . . . fail 
constitutional muster.”108 
The Court did not proceed further, declining to aver which 
level of scrutiny is applicable to Second Amendment challenges 
or to specify which other gun restrictions may be 
unconstitutional.109  However, as general language of restriction, 
the Court noted, in dicta, that the right articulated should not 
“be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions 
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”110 
 
100 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789, 2797. 
101 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
102 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799, 2801. 
103 Id. at 2797. 
104 Id. at 2799. 
105 Id. at 2817. 
106 See id. at 2817–18. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 2821. 
110 Id. at 2816–17. 
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2. Heller Dissenting Opinions 
Each of the two dissents in Heller focuses on a distinct issue.  
While it appears that the entire Court concurred as to some form 
of an individual right under the Second Amendment,111 Justice 
Stevens considered the right applicable only in relation to a 
militia purpose.112  Justice Breyer concluded the gun control law 
at issue was a reasonable burden on gun owners and a 
proportionate response to urban gun-related violence.113 
In contrast to the Heller majority, Justice Stevens’s dissent 
opined that “to keep” and “to bear” are not separate rights but 
one right “to have arms available and ready for military service, 
and to use them for military purposes when necessary.”114  The 
key to Justice Stevens’s dissent is that the Second Amendment is 
limited to a strictly military application, not a private right of 
confrontation or self-defense.115 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion noted agreement with 
Justice Stevens’s conclusion, stating that while militia and self-
defense interests are intertwined, “self-defense alone, detached 
from any militia-related objective, is not the [Second] 
Amendment’s concern.”116  However, the key to Justice Breyer’s 
dissent is an “interest-balancing” approach, weighing urban gun 
problems against the limited Second Amendment right to possess 
firearms.117  The opinion concludes, that based on precedential 
First Amendment “intermediate scrutiny” jurisprudence, courts 
should defer to the judgment of the legislature.118 
 
111 Id. at 2797; id. at 2848 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
112 Id. at 2822–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
113 See id. at 2847–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115 See id. at 2846. 
116 Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 2852. 
118 Id. at 2860 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)) 
(“[T]his Court, in First Amendment cases applying intermediate scrutiny, has said 
that [the Court’s] ‘sole obligation’ in reviewing a legislature’s ‘predictive judgments’ 
is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments,’ the legislature ‘has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.’ ”). 
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B. McDonald v. Chicago: Second Amendment Incorporation to 
the States 
Heller did not decide if the Second Amendment is 
incorporated to the states.119  It was not necessary to consider 
incorporation because the District of Columbia is entirely under 
federal jurisdiction.120  Incorporation is a legal theory that makes 
applicable to the states the provisions of the Bill of Rights 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.121  There are two theories of 
incorporation: “total” and “selective.”122  These theories, as the 
names imply, either incorporate the Bill of Rights in toto or ad 
hoc, respectively.123  The Slaughter-House Cases,124 decided in 
1873, rejected total incorporation under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and still stands as good law.125  Modern 
jurisprudence is premised on the selective incorporation 
approach; prior to the McDonald decision, all but “the Second, 
the Third, the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth, and the Seventh 
Amendments” had been incorporated to, and had become binding 
on, the states.126  Before McDonald, the last time the Court 
considered the Second Amendment’s application to the states was 
prior to modern incorporation jurisprudence.127 
On June 28, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
concise ruling in McDonald, settling the question of Second 
 
119 Id. at 2813 n.23 (majority opinion). 
120 See id.; see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box 
Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 10 (2010). 
121 16A GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 421 (2d ed. 2010). 
122 Id. 
123 See id. 
124 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
125 See id. at 77–79. 
126 DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
CTR., THE GEM OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGES 
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20 (2008), available at 
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/filelists/241_Gem_of_the_Constitution.pdf. 
127 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (“With 
respect to [United States v.] Cruikshank’s [, 92 U.S. 542 (1875),] continuing validity 
on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note that Cruikshank 
also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not 
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases. 
Our later decisions in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) and Miller v. 
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894), reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only 
to the Federal Government.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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Amendment incorporation.128  The question presented asked the 
Court to consider whether the Second Amendment right 
articulated in Heller is incorporated to the states under either 
the Due Process Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.129  In the narrow context of the 
Second Amendment, incorporation under either Due Process or 
Privileges and Immunities would have a similar net result, but 
the Court declined to reconsider the Slaughter-House Cases and 
the issue of incorporation under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.130  Deciding the issue under the selective incorporation 
Due Process approach, the Court determined that the right 
articulated in Heller applies equally to the states because it is “a 
provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is 
fundamental from an American perspective.”131  Although the 
Court uses the word “fundamental,” it is careful to note that the 
assurances in Heller limiting the right to bear arms are 
unaffected by incorporation: “incorporation does not imperil 
every law regulating firearms.”132  Given the individual rights 
reading in Heller, it was highly improbable that Second 
Amendment jurisprudence would not be incorporated to the 
states in McDonald.133 
 
 
128 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
129 Id. (“Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms is incorporated as against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities or Due Process Clauses.”). 
130 Id. at 3030–31. 
131 Id. at 3050. 
132 Id. at 3047. 
133 See David A. Lieber, Comment, The Cruikshank Redemption: The Enduring 
Rationale for Excluding the Second Amendment from the Court’s Modern 
Incorporation Doctrine, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1079, 1083 (2005) (“In most 
instances where a constitutional right enjoys textual support, the Court’s 
endorsement of the right as uniquely individual is both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for its incorporation.”). Additionally, the states largely support 
incorporation of the Second Amendment. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the 
Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 130–31 (“In McDonald, 
with incorporation squarely before the Court, 38 states filed an amicus in favor of 
incorporation.”).  
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III. LEGAL FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING: POLICY AND LAW 
PHAs hold a legitimate and important governmental interest 
in the suppression of crime and violence in public housing.134  
PHAs represent not only a governmental interest in safety and 
general welfare but a proprietary ownership interest.  To this 
end, PHAs are given wide berth in controlling public housing 
developments.  Public housing tenants are regulated to a much 
higher degree than in a traditional landlord-tenant 
relationship—tenants are required to submit financial 
information for income certification, seek PHA approval for 
certain changes to household composition, and agree to transfer 
units upon PHA request.135  In the First Amendment context, 
courts have permitted PHAs to interfere with tenants’ rights of 
free association given circumstances related to crime and 
violence reduction, and “one-strike” evictions provide PHAs with 
a high degree of discretion over lease terminations.136  Therefore, 
burdening individual rights in public housing is not immediately 
suspect given the regulatory state under which tenants live.  
However, there are limits.  For instance, warrantless contraband 
sweeps were enjoined as a violation of tenants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.137 
As for public housing residents possessing legal firearms 
within their units, there is no clear answer.  There is no uniform 
legislation, policy, or decisive judicial ruling to settle the 
questions that arise.  This Part outlines the present state of the 
law regarding guns in public housing.  Federal housing policy is 
first considered, although neither HUD nor Congress has 
followed a clear path. 
A. HUD’s Position on Guns in Public Housing 
At present, HUD does not have an official position either for 
or against tenant possession of legal firearms in public housing 
 
134 Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Rucker v. Davis, 
237 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
135 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(c) (2010). 
136 See generally Chavez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 973 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding eviction from public housing for failure to control guests in violation of 
lease); Herring v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 90 C 3797, 1995 WL 77305, at *1, *10 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 21, 1995) (upholding eviction of tenant who allegedly signed in three 
nonresidents who were members of an anti-Chicago Housing Authority protest 
group under false names). 
137 See Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
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developments.138  The sample public housing lease requires a 
tenant not to “display, use, or possess or allow members of 
Tenant’s household or guests to display, use or possess any 
illegal firearms, (operable or inoperable) or other illegal weapons 
as defined by the laws and courts of the State of ______ anywhere 
on the property of PHA.”139  Unlike housing regulations, the 
sample lease is not codified and serves only as a resource for 
PHAs to consult.  HUD regulations explicitly address pet 
ownership in public housing, but they do not address legal gun 
ownership.140   
Fifteen years ago, HUD took a stronger stance on the issue of 
guns in public housing.  In 1994, during the tenure of HUD 
Secretary Cisneros, the Clinton administration considered 
banning firearms from all federally-funded public housing—
equivocating between prohibiting only handguns and an outright 
ban on all firearms—in an effort to reduce violent crime.141  
Secretary Cisneros said of the proposition, “there is no doubt that 
I feel that is the proper direction.”142  When announcing the plan, 
the Secretary proclaimed, “We have the authority.”  Although it 
is questionable that the federal Housing Act authorizes HUD to 
promulgate such a regulation.  The Secretary also mentioned 
potential controversy over federal-versus-local enactment of a 
firearms ban.143 
 
 
138 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
GUIDEBOOK 189 (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph 
/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf (“Optional provisions included in many PHA leases relate 
to a wide range of topics including for example: use or possession of weapons . . . in a 
PHA unit.”); see also LEE WILLIAMS, CAESAR RODNEY INST., HUD: PUBLIC HOUSING 
GUN BANS A LOCAL DECISION 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.caesarrodney.org 
/pdfs/WHAlegalfolloPDF.pdf (“ ‘[HUD] do[es not] have any policy that relates to 
[public housing firearms bans],’ said Maria Bynum, spokesperson for HUD’s regional 
office in Philadelphia . . . . Bynum explained that while HUD subsidizes public 
housing, and conducts limited inspections, they do not get involved, ‘in day-to-day 
operations. [HUD is] not involved in that.’ ”). 
139 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
GUIDEBOOK app. 4, at 293 (2003) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phgb_app4_7new.pdf. 
140 See 24 C.F.R. § 960.707 (2010). 
141 Scripps Howard, U.S. Considers Ban on All Guns in Public Housing, PLAIN 
DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 5, 1994, at 12A. 
142 Susan Page, Prez Eyes Gun Ban in Public Housing, NEWSDAY, Feb. 5, 1994, 
at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
143 Id. 
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Opponents of the proposed Clinton-Cisneros gun ban argued 
the plan would “skirt the constitutional guarantee of [the] right 
to bear arms . . . [because t]enants could still own guns but would 
have to sign a lease saying they could not possess the gun in 
their homes or on housing authority property.”144  In contrast, 
proponents of the ban, such as then-executive director of the 
National Association of Housing and Development Officials, 
stated the proposed ban simply “represents an attempt by the 
‘owner-manager of public housing development to try to ensure 
the safety and security of residents.’ ”145  The proposed ban never 
came to fruition. 
The later-published HUD study on firearm-related violence 
in public housing found a general decline in crime rates in public 
housing developments.146  Even so, HUD determined firearm-
related violence remained a prevalent problem because gun-
related violence and victimization disproportionately impacts 
public housing residents.147  HUD proposed a number of anti-
crime and gun control initiatives but stopped short of suggesting 
banning guns from public housing.148   
In 1999, around the time the HUD gun-violence study was 
released, the Clinton White House and HUD implemented 
“BuyBack America.”149  Under this now-defunct program,150 HUD 
allocated $15 million to PHAs to partner with local law 
enforcement agencies to purchase guns for $50 per firearm; the 
goal of the program was to remove 300,000 guns from the 
 
144 Howard, supra note 141. 
145 Id. (the article incorrectly states the name of the organization as the 
“National Association of Housing and Development Agencies”). 
146 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 10. 
147 See id. at 8. 
148 See id. at 29–30. The recommendations advanced in the study include 
increased formula grants for anti-crime strategies, community gun safety initiatives, 
and crime prevention through environmental design. Id. at 30. 
149 Notice of Funding Availability; Public Housing Drug Elimination Program; 
Gun BuyBack Violence Reduction Initiative, 64 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (Nov. 3, 1999); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., President Clinton Announces 
Violence-Prevention Initiative To Buy Up to 300,000 Guns (Sept. 9, 1999), 
http://archives.hud.gov/news/1999/pr99-185.html.  
150 See NOFA for Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Gun BuyBack 
Violence Reduction Initiative; Notice of Amendment and Republication, 65 Fed. Reg. 
5400 (Feb. 3, 2000) (“The Department will no longer approve PHA applications for 
further gun buyback violence reduction initiatives under this notice after the 
available matching funds have been awarded.”).  
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streets.151  Then-HUD Secretary Cuomo stated, in regard to the 
buyback program, “Guns kill and injure people every day in 
crimes, in accidents, and in suicides.  Buying back guns will save 
lives and will help build strong partnerships between police and 
people in communities to work together to reduce gun 
violence.”152  The Clinton administration and Secretary Cuomo 
also threatened litigation against gun manufacturers, offering to 
support the nation’s PHAs in a class-action suit designed to urge 
the production of safer firearms.153   
Gun control initiatives and threatened litigation have not 
been prominent in HUD public housing policy since the Clinton 
administration.  President Bush terminated BuyBack America,154 
and the Obama administration has not defined a public housing 
firearms policy, focusing instead on equality of civil rights and 
improved neighborhoods.155 
B. Congressional Position on Guns in Public Housing 
In 1994, the United States House of Representatives 
introduced House Bill 4062, entitled “Safe Public Housing Act.”156  
The bill did not seek a per se firearms ban in public housing, but 
rather left the choice to residents.  The law would have 
established a tenant referendum, allowing public housing 
residents to elect either to ban firearms from their development 
or to require firearm registration; these gun controls would have 
been later incorporated into tenant leases.157  The proposal did 
not make it out of committee. 
Contrarily, in 2009, the United States House of 
Representatives sought to permit unfettered legal firearm 
possession in public housing under House Bill 3045, entitled 
 
151 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 149. 
152 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 David Stout & Richard Perez-Pena, Housing Agencies To Sue Gun Makers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999, at A1. 
154 See Notice Terminating Funding Availability for Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program Gun Buyback Violence Reduction Initiative, 66 Fed. Reg. 
38,301 (July 23, 2001). 
155 See, e.g., REMARKS AT A DISCUSSION ON URBAN AND METROPOLITAN POLICY, 
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC 00562, at 3 (July 13, 2009); Change.gov., The Obama-
Biden Plan, http://change.gov/agenda/urbanpolicy_agenda (last visited Nov. 21, 
2010). 
156 Safe Public Housing Act, H.R. 4062, 103d Cong. (1994). 
157 Id. § 26(b)(1). 
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“Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009.”158  An amendment 
agreed to in committee included the language:  “Neither the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, nor any public 
housing agency, nor any owner of federally assisted housing may 
establish any prohibition or restriction on the otherwise lawful 
possession or use of firearms in federally assisted housing.”159  
This language encountered forceful public opposition from local 
governmental entities.160  It appears there is insufficient support 
for this bill to pass into law. 
This latter legislation demonstrates congressional 
acceptance of the individual rights reading of the Second 
Amendment presented in Heller.161  Congressional support for 
gun rights is further exemplified by the number of 
Congresspersons who joined as amici supporting the Second 
Amendment in the Heller and McDonald cases.  When Heller was 
before the Supreme Court, fifty-five Senators and two hundred 
and fifty Representatives urged the Court to strike down the gun 
control law as unconstitutional.162  McDonald garnered similar 
support, adding two additional Senators and one Representative 
 
158 Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 3045, 111th Cong. 
159 Id. § 578A. 
160 See, e.g., Press Release, Mayor Greg Nickels, The Nation’s Mayors Oppose 
Thune Amendment, Actions To Weaken Gun Safety Laws (July 20, 2009), 
http://usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/RELEASENICKELSONTHUNEGUNAM
ENDMENT72009.pdf (“[T]he gun lobby is . . . pushing members of Congress to offer 
amendments to legislation that will make it easier for criminals and others who 
shouldn’t have access to guns . . . . [The amendment] would bar public housing 
authorities from restricting gun ownership among public housing residents, a 
practice that has been in place in some areas for a decade or more and has helped to 
make these projects safer places in which to live.”); Mike Mentrek, Cuyahoga 
Metropolitan Housing Authority Faults U.S. House Plan To Allow Guns in Public 
Housing, CLEVELAND.COM (July 10, 2009, 9:17 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro 
/2009/07/cuyahoga_metropolitan_housing.html (“ ‘This [proposal] goes opposite to 
everything we’ve tried to do in the past 10 or 15 years to regain control of public 
housing, to move crime and drugs away,’ said George Phillips, executive director of 
[Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority]. ‘It’s short sighted . . . and I can’t speak 
strongly enough about how absurd this is,’ he said.” (first alteration in original)). 
161 In final form, the text of section 512—Protecting Americans from Violent 
Crime—states that “Congress needs to weigh in on the new regulations to ensure 
that unelected bureaucrats and judges cannot again override the Second 
Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.” Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 512(a)(7), 123 Stat. 
1734, 1765. 
162 Brief for 55 Members of United States Senate et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 
07-290). 
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to Heller’s amici numbers.163  Each of these briefs represented the 
largest number of Congresspersons to join together in a Supreme 
Court amicus brief.164  At this time, there is substantial 
congressional support for individual rights under the Second 
Amendment, although no further legislation specifically 
targeting firearms in public housing has been introduced. 
C. State of the Law  
There is scant legal authority as to firearm possession in 
public housing.  In what little case law and legal scholarship are 
available, there is no uniformity across the authorities, and state 
statutes plainly vary from one jurisdiction to the next.  The 
following Section overviews firearm possession on government-
owned property and in public housing as it stands today.  The 
discussion encompasses relevant decisional law and legal 
scholarship both prior and immediately subsequent to Heller. 
1. Government-Owned Buildings 
Even though PHAs are state governmental actors entitled to 
regulate PHA-owned property,165 there is a general dearth of 
caselaw analyzing the status of PHAs as property owners and 
managers, particularly with respect to the right to bear arms.  As 
such, a review of weapons regulations involving other types of 
government-owned properties may lend valuable insight into the 
issue of guns in public housing.  Both state and federal laws are 
useful in this regard. 
As a general premise, the Heller Court took care to note that 
the individual right articulated in no way impugns “laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings.”166  The Court did not explain 
the rationale for permitting such gun laws to remain intact nor 
did it provide objective standards to evaluate what constitutes a 
“sensitive place.”  Nonetheless, implicit in this proclamation is  
 
 
163 Brief for Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2009) (No. 08-1521). 
164 Kopel, supra note 133. 
165 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966) (“The State, no less 
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”). 
166 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 (2008) (emphasis added). 
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the understanding that Heller does not affect jurisprudence 
upholding and rationalizing gun bans in government-owned 
buildings and properties. 
On federal lands, a recently enacted law repealed prior 
regulations that prohibited firearm possession in national parks.  
Explaining the rationale for this change in the law, Congress 
stated that the now-repealed law had prevented “individuals 
complying with Federal and State laws from exercising the 
[S]econd [A]mendment rights of the individuals.”167  However, 
most other federal properties are still considered to be gun-free 
zones.  Federal law criminalizes the possession of firearms in all 
federal buildings and courthouse facilities.168  For instance, a 
post-Heller court upheld a handgun ban on property owned by 
the United States Postal Service, reasoning that “restrictions on 
guns stemmed from [the Postal Service’s] constitutional 
authority as the property owner.”  Additionally, usage of the 
parking lot where the firearm was found made it “a place of 
regular government business, . . . fall[ing] under the ‘sensitive 
places’ exception recognized by Heller.”169  This ruling confirms 
that a government landowner may regulate its property as it sees 
fit and implies a broad application of the “sensitive places” 
concept. 
Similarly, state and local governments prohibit firearm 
possession within governmental facilities and on government-
owned property.  A state government, “no less than a private 
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated . . . .  The 
United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the 
use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory 
purpose.”170   
For instance, a 2004 Tennessee Attorney General opinion 
addresses the right of government landlords—not PHAs 
specifically—to regulate firearm possession on government-
owned land.171  The Tennessee Constitution has a right to bear 
 
167 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-24, § 512(a)(4), 123 Stat. 1734, 1765.  
168 18 U.S.C. § 930 (2006 & Supp. II).  
169 United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010).  
170 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47–48. 
171 Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 04-020, 2004 WL 367637, at *1 (Feb. 9, 2004) 
(citations omitted). 
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arms provision, but the state supreme court has recognized the 
legislative police power to regulate firearms.172  The state has the 
authority to prohibit firearm possession on government-owned 
property, and “local governments have been granted the power 
[under state statute] to determine if they wish to allow weapons 
on their property.”173  Any regulation must be “guided by” and 
“restrained to” the state constitution and “bear some well defined 
relation to the prevention of crime.”174  Essentially, state and 
local governments have the right to regulate government-owned 
properties so long as the regulations are within constitutional 
bounds.  By extension, PHAs, as local government actors, may 
regulate weapons on PHA-owned properties in an effort to 
prevent crime. 
2. Legal Firearms in Public Housing 
“In response to escalating violent crime, drugs and chaos 
within public housing, several housing authorities have looked to 
gun control as an antidote to violence and crime.”175  PHAs 
address gun control through “house rules” and lease provisions, 
but there is no standardization.  Some leases do not address 
firearm possession at all, others prohibit only illegal firearm 
possession, some require permits or registration, and yet others 
ban outright the possession of any firearm or munitions.176   
 
172 See id. at *1–2. 
173 Id. at *3. 
174 Id. at *2. 
175 Lloyd L. Hicks, Guns in Public Housing: Constitutional Right or Prescription 
for Violence?, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 153, 153 (1995) 
(referencing PHAs in Chicago, Illinois; Portland, Maine; and Richmond, Virginia). 
176 See, e.g., Bloomington Hous. Auth., Sample Public Housing Dwelling Lease 5, 
http://www.bhaindiana.net/pdfs/BHA_Lease11.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) 
(prohibiting firearm possession); Clinton Cnty. Hous. Auth., Public Housing Lease 
Agreement—Part I: Terms and Conditions 8, http://www.clintoncountyhousing.com/ 
Lease.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting possession of illegal firearms); 
Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policy 14, 
http://www.cmha.net/information/docs/acop.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) 
(prohibiting firearm possession); Hous. Auth. of the City of Kan. City, Kan., Part I—
Residential Lease Agreement: Terms and Conditions 10, http://www.kckha.org/ 
Graphics_Forms/frm-HM-50.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm 
possession); Hous. Auth. of Murray, Ky., Public Housing Handbook 19, 35 
http://www.phamurray.org/murray%20housing%20webpage/murray%20housing%20
webpage/pictures/handbook.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting discharge of 
firearms); Hous. Auth. of Texarkana, Ark., Part I of the Residential Lease 
Agreement: Terms and Conditions, http://www.txkarhousing.info/sitebuildercontent/ 
sitebuilderfiles/PARTIoftheRESIDENTIALLEASEAGREEMENT.doc (last visited 
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The law is unsettled when it comes to banning firearms 
through a public housing lease.  PHAs even disagree as to the 
constitutionality of such bans.  For instance, recently, one PHA 
in northeast Florida tried to disarm tenants, while another PHA 
from the same area of the state determined that the Constitution 
requires “for better or worse” that law-abiding residents be 
permitted to possess firearms.177  As this Section will address, 
legislatures, courts, and state Attorneys General in various 
jurisdictions also reach differing conclusions as to the validity of 
public housing firearm bans. 
a. Decisional Law 
In 1990, public housing tenants in Richmond, Virginia 
brought suit against the local PHA.178  Tenants claimed that a 
number of lease terms were “unreasonable” and in violation of a 
federal law explicitly prohibiting “unreasonable terms or 
conditions” in public housing leases.179  One of the challenged 
lease terms prohibited possession of firearms and weapons.180  
After reviewing the lease, the court upheld as reasonable a 
generalized ban prohibiting public housing tenants from 
possessing any guns or firearms but also determined a 
prohibition on “weapon[s] of any type” to be unreasonably 
 
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession); Littleton Hous. Auth., Application 
for Subsidized Housing Programs, General Guidelines (Effective 3-1-2010), 
http://www.littletongov.org/housing/files/LHAapp-2010-b.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 
2010) (prohibiting illegal use of firearms); New Brunswick Hous. Auth., New 
Brunswick Housing Authority Lease, http://www.newbrunswickhousing.org/public/ 
lease.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession without a 
valid “Firearm Purchaser Identification Card”); Norwalk Hous. Auth., Colonial 
Village House Rules & Regulations 2, http://www.norwalkha.org/UserFiles/File/ 
Colonial%20Village%20Tenant%20Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting possession of firearms unless gun-owner has a state 
permit and has registered the firearm with the PHA); Quincy Hous. Auth., Part I of 
the Residential Lease Agreement: Terms and Conditions 5, http://quincyha. 
phanetwork.com/uploads/Site_1006/Federal%20Lease%20current.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting firearm possession). 
177 Jason Yurgartis, Public Housing Ban on Guns Challenged, NEWS-LEADER 
(Fla.), Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.fbnewsleader.com/articles/2009/10/22/ 
news/00newsbanchallenged.txt (quoting Senior Vice President of the Jacksonville 
Housing Authority Fred McKinnies) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 See Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 
751 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d, No. 91-2608, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27694 (4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991). 
179 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2006)). 
180 Id. at 1206. 
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overbroad.181  The court found that the “elimination of guns and 
firearms from public housing is rationally calculated to reduce 
the crime and violence that plague public housing.”182  So holding, 
the court simply severed the overbroad portion from the lease.183  
Shortly following publication of the opinion, the Virginia 
Legislature passed a law barring public housing leases from 
conditioning tenancy on the prohibition or restriction of legal 
firearms.184  Subsequently, at least one Virginia PHA declined to 
implement a firearm ban in public housing due to this statutory 
mandate.185 
In 1993, Portland, Maine public housing tenants brought 
suit against their local PHA.186  The tenants alleged a lease 
provision banning all possession or display of firearms on public 
housing premises was invalid and unenforceable.187  The trial 
court upheld the ban as a “reasonable measure rationally related 
to advancing the health, safety and welfare of those residing in 
the PHA premises.”188  On appeal in 1995, the Maine Supreme 
Court vacated the trial court’s decision on statutory grounds.189  
The state supreme court determined the PHA to be a political 
subdivision under state statute, subject to preemption in the field 
of firearm regulation.190  Based on this determination, the court 
held invalid the lease provision banning firearm possession, 
without ever reaching the constitutional issue.191  The court also 
 
181 Id. at 1206–07.  
182 Id. at 1206. 
183 Id. at 1207 (stating the reasonable post-severance lease provision should 
read: “To refrain from the use and/or possession on Management’s property of guns, 
firearms (operable or inoperable), nunchucks, or similar instruments, blackjacks and 
explosive devices.”). 
184 See 1991-720 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (codified as VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 55-248.9 (2010)). Subsequent to the lawsuit and legislation, the lease provision 
now prohibits only use and possession of illegal firearms. Richmond Redevelopment 
& Hous. Auth., Dwelling Lease 15 (Nov. 2004), http://www.rrha.org/html/public/ 
samplelease.pdf. 
185 See Susie Stoughton, Suffolk Backs Off Gun Ban Proposal Officials Will Send 
Letters of Apology to Residents of City Public Housing Units, VA. PILOT & LEDGER-
STAR, Sept. 26, 2001, at B5. 
186 Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth. (Doe I), No. CV-92-1408, 1993 Me. Super. LEXIS 
359, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1993), rev’d on statutory grounds, 656 A.2d 1200 
(Me. 1995). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at *26. 
189 Doe v. Portland Hous. Auth. (Doe II), 656 A.2d 1200, 1201 (Me. 1995). 
190 Id. at 1203–04. 
191 Id. at 1201, 1203. 
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noted a recent amendment to the Maine Constitution designed to 
protect an individual right to bear arms and found that the 
legislative history of the preemption statute proved an intent to 
have uniform gun laws statewide.192   
In 2004, a Michigan tenant, in a public housing facility for 
the elderly and disabled, brought suit against the PHA in Lincoln 
Park.193  The tenant took issue with a lease provision banning all 
firearms from the entirety of the premises.194  The court rejected 
the Second Amendment argument on the basis that the right is 
not incorporated to the states.  The court also failed to find that 
the lease provision “shock[ed] the conscience” under general 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.195  Under the 
Michigan Constitution, the court stated the right to bear arms is 
neither absolute nor fundamental.196  Based on this framework, 
the court determined that the “[r]estrictions on the right to 
possess weapons in the environment and circumstances 
described by [the PHA were] both in furtherance of a legitimate 
interest to protect its residents and a reasonable exercise of 
police power.”197  The court, finding it was not unreasonable to 
prohibit weapons in a facility catering to elderly and disabled 
individuals, also gave a measure of weight to the “specific 
environment.”198  The lease provision was ultimately held to be 
both reasonable and a minimal infringement on the tenant’s 
rights.199 
b. Attorney General Opinions 
Pre-Heller advisory opinions of attorneys general out of 
Texas,200 Arkansas,201 and Oregon202 specifically addressed the 
validity of public housing firearm bans in their respective 
jurisdictions.  The 1988 Oregon opinion first determined that 
PHAs are governmental entities, separate from municipal 
 
192 Id. at 1203. 
193 Lincoln Park Hous. Comm’n v. Andrew, No. 244259, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 
792, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2004). 
194 See id. 
195 Id. at *3–6. 
196 See id. at *7–9. 
197 Id. at *9–10. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at *10. 
200 Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *1 (Dec. 31, 1991). 
201 Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 WL 410456, at *1 (July 6, 1994). 
202 46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *1 (Sept. 12, 1988). 
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government, subject to the state constitution’s right to bear arms 
provision.203  As the state’s constitutional guarantee explicitly 
protects the right to use arms for self-defense, the opinion 
concluded that a PHA cannot impose an absolute ban on 
common-use firearms.204  The opinion further advised that a PHA 
may not provide off-site storage to circumvent the constitutional 
guarantee, but offered a number of alternative gun control 
solutions, including banning possession by minors, barring 
threatening gestures or illegal firearm discharge, and prohibiting 
possession of loaded firearms where there is no exigency of self-
defense.205 
The 1991 Texas opinion, first considering preemption, 
determined that PHAs are municipal subdivisions, not separate 
entities, and as such, are subject to the same rules as 
municipalities.206  Texas state law precludes municipal regulation 
of firearm ownership.207  Therefore, because of state preemption, 
Texas PHAs are not permitted to enact any form of firearm 
regulation in public housing developments.208  The determination 
of legislative preemption foreclosed consideration of the state 
constitution’s right to bear arms provision.209 
The 1994 Arkansas opinion evaluated the constitutionality 
on a ban on the right to bear arms.  The opinion concluded that 
no state statute would bar a lease provision banning firearms in 
public housing and that a poverty-based equal protection 
challenge would fail.  The opinion was otherwise equivocal as to a 
ban under the constitutional right to bear arms.210  The 
discussion indicated that a PHA is a state governmental actor 
not subject to the Second Amendment, and that although the 
equivalent state constitutional provision permitted reasonable  
 
 
203 See id. at *1–2. 
204 See id. at *4. 
205 See id. at *6–8. 
206 Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *1. 
207 See id. at *3–4. 
208 See id.  
209 See id. at *3. 
210 Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 94-093, 1994 WL 410456, at *4–5 (July 6, 1994). The 
opinion’s equal protection analysis relies heavily on the trial court opinion in Doe I, a 
decision which was later vacated on state statutory grounds, never reaching the 
equal protection issue. See id. at *1, *4 (citing Doe I, No. CV-92-1408, 1993 Me. 
Super. LEXIS 359, at *1 (Me. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1993), rev’d on statutory grounds, 
656 A.2d 1200 (Me. 1995)). 
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restrictions on the right to bear arms, given a lack of caselaw, it 
was not possible to accurately predict the judicial outcome if the 
lease provision were challenged.211   
Additionally, there is a 2009 post-Heller Tennessee Attorney 
General’s opinion that generally addressed the authority of a 
landlord to ban firearm possession by lease provisions.  The 
opinion neither referenced Heller nor the distinction between a 
private and public landlord.212  The opinion posited only that a 
landlord and a tenant may mutually agree to a lease provision 
prohibiting firearm possession within the leased unit, or the 
landlord may establish such a rule, provided the tenant is given 
notice of the rule prior to signing the lease.213  Even a tenant 
holding a valid handgun permit would be bound by a lease term 
prohibiting firearm possession, so long as the tenant’s waiver of 
the right to bear arms is not unconscionable or in violation of 
statute.214 
c. Threatened Litigation 
Subsequent to the Heller ruling, there was a scent of 
litigation specific to gun control in public housing, although no 
court has considered the merits.  In California, the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”), a gun-advocacy group, sued the San 
Francisco Housing Authority, contesting lease provisions that 
prohibited lawful possession of firearms and ammunition.215  The 
parties settled without judicial intervention, agreeing that the 
PHA would not enforce the lease provisions banning legal 
firearm and ammunition possession within public housing 
units.216  In Florida, an elderly man living in public housing 
owned by the Housing Authority of Fernandina Beach asserted a 
 
211 See id. at *5. 
212 See generally Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-170, 2009 WL 3666436 (Oct. 26, 
2009). The Tennessee Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act does not explicitly exclude 
public housing developments from the provisions of the Act. See TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 66-28-102 (2010). 
213 Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 09-170, 2009 WL 3666436, at *2–3.  
214 Id. at *3. But cf. Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 266 F. 
Supp. 397, 401 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding government benefits cannot be conditioned 
on waiver of constitutional rights). 
215 See Stipulation re Settlement and Dismissal of Defendants San Francisco 
Housing Authority and Henry Alvarez III Without Prejudice, Doe v. San Francisco 
Hous. Auth., No. CV-08-03112 TEH (N.D. Cal. 2009), available at 
http://volokh.com/files/sfpublichousingguns.pdf. 
216 Id. at 2–3. 
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violation of his constitutional rights based on a provision 
requiring tenants to “agree not to display, use or possess any 
firearms under penalty of eviction.”217  It appears this suit was 
dropped without public resolution.  In Delaware, the NRA 
brought suit against the Wilmington Housing Authority, 
challenging lease provisions that ban firearms for self-defense 
use.218  This suit, brought in 2010, has been stayed.219  These 
threatened lawsuits do not establish any place in law but are 
significant to show that public housing firearm bans will be a 
point of contention in future gun control litigation. 
IV. LEGAL FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING AFTER  
HELLER AND MCDONALD 
A public housing tenant’s unit is undeniably his or her 
family’s home, albeit there are greater restrictions and 
regulations placed on tenants because they reside under a 
governmental landlord.220  The question is whether, after Heller 
and McDonald, public housing tenants will have the right to 
possess legal firearms within their homes.  This Part explores the 
validity of a federal law imposing a firearms ban, state law 
jurisprudence, and the potential challenges to public housing 
firearms bans under Due Process and Equal Protection given 
Second Amendment incorporation. 
A. Validity of a Federal Law Affecting Guns in Public Housing 
As noted, in 1994 Congress endeavored to pass a law that 
would have implemented a referendum among public housing 
tenants to self-regulate gun restrictions,221 and in 2009, Congress 
sought to pass a law unequivocally permitting firearm possession 
 
217 Yurgartis, supra note 177. 
218 Across the USA News from Every State, USA TODAY (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition/2010-06-01-states01_ST_U.htm. 
219 Legal Community Against Violence, Post-Heller Litigation Summary 6 (Sept. 
20, 2010), available at http://www.lcav.org/content/post-heller_summary.pdf (Doe v. 
Wilmington Hous. Auth., case no. 10-473, is “currently stayed”). 
220 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (2010) (listing the lease requirements for leases 
between the PHA and tenants); Emily Bazar, Public Housing Kicks Smoking Habit, 
USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-04-04-public-
housing-smoking_N.htm (“If you live in public housing, your life is regulated.” 
(quoting Vincent Curry, board member of National Fair Housing Alliance)). 
221 H.R. 4062, 103d Cong. (1994). 
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in public housing.222  So far unsuccessful, Congress may soon 
enact a statute affecting firearms in public housing.  It is also 
possible that, rather than enacting an explicit law, Congress will 
delegate authority to HUD to establish a public housing firearms 
policy.  The question that arises is whether such a law or 
regulation, either permitting or banning firearms in public 
housing developments, would be valid.  
The power to spend for the general welfare and the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants broad authority to 
Congress to enact federal housing laws.223  On occasion, federal 
housing law will preempt state or local law under the Supremacy 
Clause.224  Federal law may preempt state law in one of three 
ways: an express statement, pervasive field occupation, or 
irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law.225  
Preemption under a federal statute requires congressional intent 
to preempt; preemption under a federal regulation requires that 
an agency have both the authority to act and the intent to 
preempt.226  Although Congress has not demonstrated any intent 
to occupy the entire field, there are portions of federal housing 
law that have superseded or expressly preempted state law.227  
However, federal housing policy is designed such that Congress 
may “yield maximum possible autonomy to local housing 
authorities.”228   
Any public housing gun control law Congress enacts will be 
presumptively constitutional and applicable to public housing 
through the PHAs because of the expansive reach of federal 
housing law.  Congress may enact a law within the province of 
federal housing law or use its spending power to attach 
conditions to receipt of federal funds to pursue broad housing 
 
222 H.R. 3045, 111th Cong. (2009). 
223 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3; City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 
U.S. 329, 333 (1945) (holding a federal housing law constitutional under the General 
Welfare Clause); Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.S.C. 1980) (holding 
a federal housing law constitutional under the Commerce Clause), aff’d, 664 F.2d 
1210 (4th Cir. 1981). 
224 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
225 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
226 See id.; Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 
(1983) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381–82 (1961)). 
227 EJ Hurst II, Note, Rules, Regs, and Removal: State Law, Foreseeability, and 
Fair Play in One Strike Terminations from Federally-Subsidized Public Housing, 38 
BRANDEIS L.J. 733, 745–46 (2000). 
228 Id. at 745. 
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policy objectives.229  However, independent constitutional rights 
considerations may establish a bar to direct legislative mandate 
and conditional grants.230   
The Second Amendment, as a direct restraint on Congress, 
may invalidate a firearm ban as an infringement or prevent the 
attachment of a similar condition.  Furthermore, firearm 
regulation is an area traditionally left to the states as an exercise 
of state police power.231  Congressional attempts to either permit 
or restrict firearms in public housing may be seen as an 
encroachment on the basic principles of federalism because each 
state constitution interprets the right to bear arms differently, 
even in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.232  However, if 
such a federal housing law or funding condition does not 
improperly encroach upon state police power or violate 
constitutional guarantees, it will preempt any state statute that 
presents an affirmative obstacle to the effective implementation 
of federal housing policy.233   
Due to Second Amendment incorporation, Fourteenth 
Amendment protections may also establish an independent 
constitutional bar because Congress cannot induce the states to 
 
229 See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (characterizing Spending 
Clause legislation in the nature of a contract); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 
206–07 (1987) (“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and 
has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal 
statutory and administrative directives.’ ” (internal citations omitted)); James v. 
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971) (stating that while the Housing Act offers aid for 
low-income housing, there is no requirement for state and local governments to 
accept); Perry v. Hous. Auth., 486 F. Supp. 498, 500–01 (D.S.C. 1980) (stating that 
the Commerce Clause was a constitutional basis for the 1937 Housing Act), aff’d, 
664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). 
230 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
231 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (explaining that criminal 
law enforcement and firearm regulation rests primarily with the states). 
232 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestible [sic] 
that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ ”). 
233 See Ross v. Broadway Towers, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2006) (“[F]ederal public policy in providing subsidized housing that is safe and 
crime-free for all the tenants is paramount to any policy at issue in [the Tennessee 
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act]. . . . [A]pplication of [the state] 
statute is preempted by the federal regulations because it ‘stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ ” 
(quoting Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments, 890 
A.2d 249, 255 (D.C. 2006))). 
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violate citizens’ constitutional rights.234  “Congress has no 
affirmative power to authorize the States to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing 
legislation that purports to validate any such violation.”235  
Therefore, a federal law or condition banning firearm possession 
in public housing will be invalid if it mandates PHAs to violate 
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it incorporates the 
Second Amendment.   
Conversely, a law or condition requiring PHAs to permit 
legal firearm possession could be validly enacted as a remedy to 
state violation of the Second Amendment right, as incorporated.  
In addition to the initial grants of power from which national 
housing laws arise, Congress has the power to prevent or remedy 
state constitutional violations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.236  Congress has broad power 
to reach into areas of law otherwise traditionally reserved to the 
states under this clause.237  The requirement for validity is 
congruence or proportionality of the means to the ends, given the 
evil presented; congressional remedies of this type are entitled to 
substantial deference against constitutional challenge.238  
Permitting firearm possession in the face of infringement on the 
right articulated in Heller seems to satisfy this standard.  Even if 
a balance is struck between state and federal gun control, if 
PHAs nationwide impose strict firearm bans, Congress would 
have authority to remedy the infringement through a statute 
allowing firearm possession in public housing.   
To date, Congress has been unsuccessful in enacting any law 
specifically purporting to regulate firearm possession in public 
housing developments. 
 
234 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation on 
the spending power . . . stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power 
may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.”). 
235 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). 
236 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
237 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (“Legislation which deters 
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously 
reserved to the States.’ ” (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976))). 
238 Id. at 530, 536. 
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B. Second Amendment Incorporation and State Law 
If the Second Amendment had not been incorporated under 
McDonald, state law would have remained much the same as 
before Heller.  Under “right to bear arms” provisions, state court 
judges would have been at liberty to take cues from the Heller 
ruling but would not be required to do so.239  However, under 
McDonald, state courts are required to consider if firearm bans—
in state laws, local ordinances, and public housing leases—are 
valid under state statutory and constitutional law, as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Generally, a court will first consider 
legislative preemption to avoid reaching the constitutional issue.  
When preemption is determined either not to be at issue or is not 
dispositive, the court will then turn to applicable state and 
federal constitutional provisions. 
1. State Law Preemption 
The legal status of PHAs varies from one state to the next.  
In some jurisdictions, PHAs are entities separate from the 
municipalities in which they are located; in other jurisdictions, 
PHAs are considered municipal subdivisions.240  In jurisdictions 
where PHAs are treated like municipal subdivisions, they may be 
unequivocally preempted from imposing gun controls on public 
housing residents.  A form of preemption adopted in many states 
is a limitation or prohibition on the ability of counties and 
municipalities to exercise “home-rule power” to enact firearm 
restrictions.241  When a PHA is deemed to be part of a 
municipality that is prohibited from promulgating gun 
restrictions, then the PHA too is prohibited.242  Although these 
municipal subdivision PHAs establish a firearms ban by rule and 
 
239 See People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 806–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see 
also Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12–13 (Tex. 1992) (“[S]tate courts have 
increasingly looked to their own constitutions, rather than the Federal Constitution, 
in examining the extent of their citizens’ liberties. . . . [T]he state court may examine 
its own constitution first to determine whether the right in question is protected. 
Within the context of such an analysis, a state court can benefit from the insights of 
well-reasoned and developed federal jurisprudence, but is not compelled to reach 
identical results.”).  
240 E.g., Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 WL 527492, at *3 (Dec. 31, 1991); 
46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *2 (Sept. 12, 1988). 
241 Kopel, supra note 133, at 123 (“Forty-six states now have limited or complete 
preemption of local firearms laws.”). 
242 See, e.g., Doe II, 656 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Me. 1995); Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-
71, 1991 WL 527492, at *3.   
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enforce it through a lease provision, such regulation is 
tantamount to a municipal firearms ordinance, premised on the 
legislative intent of the preemption statute.243  As such, a lease 
provision banning firearms in public housing would be 
invalidated without reaching the constitutional issue.  In 
contrast, if a PHA is an entity deemed to be separate from the 
municipality, it will fall outside state law prohibitions on local 
firearm regulations, unless otherwise specified by statute.244 
2. State Constitutional Law 
If a state statute does not preempt local gun regulation, then 
a PHA’s firearm ban will be evaluated under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the state’s “right to bear arms” jurisprudence 
or, in the absence of such a constitutional provision, the state’s 
decisional law.245  Even given incorporation, state and local 
legislatures and state courts still have the authority to 
“experiment[ ] with reasonable firearms regulations” because, 
although incorporation “limits” state and local means to “devise 
solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values,” 
incorporation “by no means eliminates” state and local police 
powers.246  It is possible for a state court to follow the same 
analytical approach as the Supreme Court but reach a different 
result under a state constitutional provision that provides for a 
broader or distinctive right.247 
 
243 See, e.g., Doe II, 656 A.2d at 1201, 1204; Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. DM-71, 1991 
WL 527492, at *3.  
244 See, e.g., 46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *2. 
245 Forty-four states have a constitutional right to bear arms provision. ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK. 
CONST. art. 2, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. 
art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, ¶ VIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, 
§ 17; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. 
CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4; KY. CONST. § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art. 
I, § 16; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. 3, 
§ 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; 
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. 
art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. I, § 21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26; TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 9; VA. CONST. art I, 
§ 13; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25; 
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 24.  
246 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citation omitted). 
247 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 420 (Conn. 2008). 
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“[S]tate constitutional doctrine on the right to bear arms is 
well developed and remarkably consistent across jurisdictions.”248  
Most state courts reason that “the right to keep and bear arms is 
not an absolute right, but is one which is subject to the right of 
the people through their legislature to enact valid police 
regulations to promote the health, morals, safety and general 
welfare of the people.”249  The police power inheres to the state 
and is limited only by the Constitution.250  On occasion, state 
courts have invalidated gun control laws as unconstitutional, but 
the vast majority of laws are upheld.251  Before McDonald, some 
cases applied a standard that asks if the right is “materially 
burden[ed]” or if the purpose of the right is frustrated.252 
However, before McDonald, most state courts, including 
those that held that an individual or fundamental right to bear 
arms exists under their state constitution, simply asked if a 
regulation was “reasonable.”253  The test asked if a regulation 
was a reasonable exercise of legislative power and was 
functionally equivalent to “rational basis” review, the lowest level 
of constitutional scrutiny.254  To survive “rational basis,” there 
need only be a rational relationship between the law at issue and 
the government interest advanced.255  State courts routinely 
upheld strict gun control laws under a reasonableness inquiry, 
even when the state constitutional right to bear arms was 
deemed fundamental.256   
 
248 Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right To Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 597, 598 (2006). 
249 Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661, 666 (Fla. 1972); accord Arnold v. 
Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 171–72 (Ohio 1993). 
250 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 3.1, at 467 (4th ed. 2007); Robert Dowlut, Bearing Arms in State Bills of 
Rights, Judicial Interpretation, and Public Housing, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 203, 205 
(1992). 
251 See Dowlut, supra note 250, at 206, 209. 
252 Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 
1458 (2009) (quoting Lacy v. State, 903 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). 
253 See Robertson v. City of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 329–30 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) 
(citing collected cases from fifteen states); Volokh, supra note 252. 
254 See Robertson, 874 P.2d at 329. 
255 Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001). 
256 See, e.g., Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 171, 173 (Ohio 1993) 
(upholding an assault weapons ban under state police power, despite finding a 
fundamental right to bear arms). 
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In support of public housing firearm bans, PHAs have a 
legitimate government interest in reducing gun-related crime 
and violence in government-owned housing.257  Indeed, 
“[p]aramount among the legitimate governmental interests 
meriting infringements on individual rights is the state’s need to 
protect the health and welfare of its citizens.”258  Thus, 
prohibiting firearm possession on PHA-owned property is a 
reasonable use of the state’s police power to reduce guns and 
violence.  Reasonableness requires little more than a 
nonarbitrary legislative pronouncement to survive constitutional 
review.  Under the pre-McDonald reasonableness test, a public 
housing firearm ban would very likely be upheld.  However, 
given Second Amendment incorporation, the reasonableness test 
will no longer be a proper analysis. 
C. Constitutionality of Guns in Public Housing After Heller and 
McDonald 
State courts are free to interpret state constitutional 
provisions to provide greater protection of a right but cannot 
reduce protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.259  
Nor can a PHA, as a governmental entity, unlawfully infringe on 
the rights guaranteed by state and federal constitutional law.  
Therefore, because McDonald incorporates the Second 
Amendment to the states, the floor of the protected right is 
Heller’s individual right, inhering to law-abiding citizens, to 
possess legal handguns for purposes of home self-defense and 
confrontation. 
Public housing developments are uniquely both government-
owned buildings and citizen dwellings, thus producing an 
inherent conflict given the holding and dicta in Heller.  Heller, as 
reiterated in McDonald, makes clear that gun bans in 
government buildings are not necessarily undone by its 
 
257 See Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (citing State 
v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 21–22 (Alaska 1978); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 501, 504 
(Alaska 1975)). 
258 Id. 
259 City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (“As a 
number of recent State Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, a state court is 
entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this Court reads 
the Federal Constitution.” (citations omitted)). 
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holding.260  A PHA is a property-owner and manager with 
authority to regulate its own, but “[t]he constitutionality of 
government regulation of its own property depends upon the 
character of the property at issue.”261   
Public housing firearm bans have not recently been 
challenged in a substantial manner, nor has a contemporary case 
reached the merits,262 and available persuasive materials do not 
take into account Heller.  The following Section explores the 
constitutionality of public housing firearm bans under both Due 
Process and Equal Protection, given Second Amendment 
incorporation.  The lease is first considered as a contract, before 
dissecting the firearm ban as a local gun control law under 
constitutional scrutiny. 
1. Lease-Based Challenges to Public Housing Firearm Bans 
Many PHAs have taken action to ban all firearms, legal and 
illegal, in public housing developments.263  The ban is typically 
implemented through a lease provision, codifying a PHA policy or 
rule.264  A tenant’s endorsement on the lease signifies the tenant’s 
agreement to a provision prohibiting firearm possession.  A lease 
is a contract, and where a contract is at issue there is, first and 
foremost, a voluntariness requirement.  In the public housing 
 
260 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008). Despite this understanding being found in 
dicta, “ ‘by the way’ statements made by the Supreme Court resonate more forcefully 
than dicta from other sources,” and is accorded significant weight. United States v. 
Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (citations omitted). 
261 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)); accord Iowa Op. Att’y 
Gen. No. 03-4-1, 2003 WL 22100958, at *5 (Apr. 7, 2003) (“[W]e have surveyed cases 
and opinions from other jurisdictions addressing preemption in the context of 
weapons regulation. The majority of courts addressing the narrow issue presented 
here—whether an express statutory preemption of firearms regulation by a 
municipality prohibits the municipality from regulating the possession of firearms 
on municipally-owned or controlled property—have recognized the inherent 
authority of a municipality to manage property which it owns or controls.”). 
262 There is a case in Delaware challenging a public housing firearms ban, but 
the case is currently stayed. See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 
219. 
263 See supra note 176. 
264 Each PHA lays out its management policies in an Admissions and Continued 
Occupancy Policy. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING 
OCCUPANCY GUIDE BOOK app. III (2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/ 
offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebook.cfm (displaying the “Sample Admissions 
and Continued Occupancy Policy”). 
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context, it is possible to argue that tenants have limited options 
for affordable housing and as such have no choice but to consent 
to the terms of the lease.  A lease is not voidable, however, solely 
because of “[t]he impoverished circumstances and subsequent 
inequality of bargaining power of public housing tenants are not 
sufficient to render an agreement voidable.”265  A public housing 
lease will not be invalidated on voluntariness grounds. 
Therefore, when contemplating the lease as a contract, there 
are two ways to consider the viability of such a lease provision 
after Heller and McDonald.  The first way is under federal 
housing law, which prohibits PHA leases from containing 
unreasonable provisions.266  The second is under the “doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions,” which holds unconstitutional the 
exchange of an enumerated right for a government benefit.267   
a. Unreasonable Terms and Conditions 
Federal law prohibits “unreasonable terms and conditions” 
in PHA leases, a phrase that is largely undefined.268  In the 
previously discussed Richmond PHA case, which upheld a public 
housing firearms ban, the court gave serious consideration to the 
definition of “unreasonable” in the context of public housing 
leases.269  As an issue of first impression, the court interpreted 
the prohibition “to require that lease terms be rationally related 
to a legitimate housing purpose.”270  The court further 
determined that “[i]n applying this test, the crucible of 
reasonableness will be defined by the particular problems and 
concerns confronting the local housing authority.  Lease 
 
265 Jason S. Thaler, Note, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional 
Condition or Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1791 (1995); see 
also Dawson v. Milwaukee Hous. Auth., 930 F.2d 1283, 1284 (7th Cir. 1991) (“One 
could say that impecunious persons ‘have no choice’ but to accept the state’s offer—
although this colloquialism is embarrassed by the fact that more than 80% of poor 
persons live in private housing.”). But see PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY, supra note 12 
(“From 2001 to 2005, the number of unassisted low-income renter households whose 
housing costs exceed 50 percent of their income—a group the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) categorizes as having ‘severe housing cost 
burdens’—increased by more than 1 million, or 20 percent.”). 
266 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2) (2006). 
267 Thaler, supra note 265, at 1795. 
268 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(2). 
269 Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 751 
F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d, No. 91-2608, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 27694 
(4th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991). 
270 Id. 
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provisions which are arbitrary and capricious, or excessively 
overbroad or under-inclusive, will be invalidated.”271  This test is 
essentially a “rational basis” consideration tailored to a 
particular PHA.  Under this formulation, it would be reasonable 
for any PHA experiencing gun problems within its housing 
developments to include a lease provision banning all firearm 
possession.   
However, most courts, when considering the validity of lease 
provisions challenged as “unreasonable,” do not delve into the 
meaning of the word.  For instance, the United States Supreme 
Court, in a footnote, concluded that lease provisions permitting 
one-strike evictions did not include unreasonable terms or 
conditions.272  In another case, a strict no-trespass policy was 
determined to implicitly violate the prohibition on unreasonable 
terms and conditions because it would be “patently unreasonable 
to prohibit public housing tenants from entertaining guests.”273 
The implication is that courts are generally conclusory when 
evaluating the reasonableness of a lease term.  While there is no 
uniform test to measure the unreasonableness of a lease 
provision, it appears that to be unreasonable, a lease term must 
be obviously arbitrary, discriminatory, or unduly oppressive.  If a 
provision is otherwise constitutional, it is likely reasonable.  
Therefore, in the context of a firearm prohibition, the 
unreasonableness prohibition appears redundant to a 
constitutionality inquiry. 
b. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
Whereas private landlord-tenant agreements provide 
freedom of contract and an opportunity for the parties to bargain, 
the lease between a public housing tenant and a PHA more 
closely mimics a contract of adhesion, where there is no 
opportunity to bargain terms.274  A public housing lease retains a 
“take it or leave it” character because many terms are HUD-
mandated and practicality requires standardization for efficiency 
both in tenant registration and lease enforcement.275   
 
 
271 Id. at 1205–06. 
272 See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128, 134 n.5 (2002). 
273 Diggs v. Hous. Auth. of Frederick, 67 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (D. Md. 1999). 
274 See Thaler, supra note 265, at 1793. 
275 See id. 
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“Realistically, it must be acknowledged that the housing 
authority prescribes the terms of the lease and that the tenant 
does not negotiate with the authority . . . .”276   
That said, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, 
the government cannot require an individual to trade 
constitutional rights for public benefits.277  The principal 
considerations under this doctrine are whether an enumerated 
right is invoked and whether the condition is germane to the 
government’s interest.278  The doctrinal principle finds that an 
unconstitutional condition exists when an unfair exchange 
occurs—namely, when a citizen trades an enumerated right to 
the government for a specific benefit. 
When contemplating the constitutionality of a lease term 
that requires tenants to forgo their right to have handguns in 
their homes for purposes of self-defense—the Second Amendment 
right—in exchange for the privilege of living in publicly-owned 
government-subsidized housing, there are two possible outcomes.  
Either the condition fails constitutional muster or the 
government has merely declined to subsidize the right. 
Unconstitutional conditions in public housing typically 
contemplate violations of core speech rights because even an 
indirect prohibition may have a chilling effect on speech.279  For 
 
276 Vinson v. Greenburgh Hous. Auth., 29 A.D.2d 338, 341, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159, 
163 (2d Dep’t 1968), aff’d, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970). But 
see 24 C.F.R. § 966.3 (2010) (requiring PHAs to solicit current tenants’ comments on 
proposed lease changes). 
277 Thaler, supra note 265, at 1795. 
278 See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1282 (2010) (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) 
and citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1460 (1989)). 
279 See generally Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) 
(“Recognizing that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 
‘chilling,’ effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition 
against the exercise of First Amendment rights, our modern ‘unconstitutional 
conditions’ doctrine holds that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person 
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’ even if 
he has no entitlement to that benefit.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408, U.S. 1, 11 (1972)); 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))); Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment 
& Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966) (granting an injunction restraining 
the PHA from proceeding to evict tenants to restrict the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights); Carrera v. Yepez, 6 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App. 1999) (denying 
qualified immunity for a PHA director and a PHA supervisor for depriving tenants 
of their First Amendment rights). 
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instance, an unconstitutional condition was found when, by 
threatening eviction, a PHA effectively prohibited tenants from 
organizing.280  The rationale was that “a tenant’s continued 
occupancy in a public housing project cannot be conditioned upon 
the tenant’s foregoing his Constitutional rights.”281  The 
previously noted 1988 Oregon Attorney General’s opinion applied 
these principles in the context of firearms, unequivocally 
concluding that a PHA “may not require an otherwise-eligible 
individual to surrender rights under [the Oregon Constitution’s 
right to bear arms provision] in order to obtain low-income 
housing.”282  Under this interpretation, tenants could not agree to 
waive their seemingly inalienable right to bear arms as a 
condition of public housing.  There is no binding decisional law 
that speaks directly to this issue, but voiding the lease term as 
an unconstitutional condition may be the proper result. 
Not all situations involving an exchange of a right for a 
governmental benefit are unconstitutional.  While courts have 
indeed found unconstitutional conditions in many situations, 
there are many cases to the contrary.  The outcome validating a 
firearms ban is premised on government denial of subsidization.  
This principle is exemplified in the context of abortion.  A 
number of courts have upheld prohibitions on expending public 
funds to finance abortion counseling and procedures, reasoning 
that the government “is not required to subsidize the exercise of 
constitutional rights.”283  Similarly, denial of food stamps to 
striking union laborers was determined not to infringe on First 
Amendment rights because a legislative decision not to subsidize 
a fundamental right is not tantamount to infringement.284 
In the realm of public housing, the HUD regulation 
permitting PHAs to require a prospective tenant to exclude an 
ineligible family member from occupancy for approval is 
analogous.285  It is possible to interpret this requirement as 
exchanging free association and intimate familial rights for the 
 
280 See Holt, 266 F. Supp. at 401. 
281 Id. (citing Lawson v. Hous. Auth. of Milwaukee, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955)). 
282 46 Or. Op. Att’y Gen. 122 No. 8196, 1988 WL 416272, at *6 (Sept. 12, 1988). 
283 Ginny Kim, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: Is the Fourth Amendment for 
Sale in Public Housing?, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 184 (1995) (citing Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)); see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
284 See Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 368 (1988). 
285 See 24 C.F.R. § 960.203(c)(3)(i) (2010). 
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benefit of public housing.  The more reasonable interpretation is 
that the government will not subsidize the right to live with a 
felon or drug-abuser, which are typical bases for declining to 
admit an individual to public housing. 
When this logic is applied to a lease provision banning legal 
firearms, it may be reasoned that the provision is constitutional 
because the government is simply not required to subsidize a 
home where the tenant can possess legal firearms for self-
defense.  Any financial hardship imposed on a public housing 
tenant can be analogized to that of striking union workers:  The 
failure of the government to subsidize a nonfundamental 
privilege only imposes a financial constraint, but it does not 
prevent the individual from exercising the enumerated right.  
There is no exaction, but rather the government is simply 
declining to extend benefits while allocating scarce resources.286  
However, this analysis tends to presume that there is a 
prospective or current tenant challenging an existing ban.  The 
analysis and result may be different where a new firearms ban is 
imposed on current tenants because the hardship of compliance 
is more significant and may be viewed as a penalty or an 
exaction.  Ultimately, permitting the lease term to stand as a 
valid condition of occupancy based on a theory of 
nonsubsidization is as equally probable an outcome voiding the 
condition under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
2. Constitutional Scrutiny of Local Firearms Regulations 
Another way to analyze the validity of a lease-based firearm 
ban is to review the rule underlying the lease provision as if it 
were a local law.  Some jurisdictions may have a local ordinance 
criminalizing firearms in public housing, which would be subject 
to a similar scrutiny analysis.287  Initially, the same legislative 
preemption analysis as under state law applies.288  Thereafter,  
 
 
 
286 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 368 (“Strikers and their union would be much better off 
if food stamps were available, but the strikers’ right of association does not require 
the Government to furnish funds to maximize the exercise of that right.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With 
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 607–08 
(1990). 
287 See, e.g., AURORA, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 29-43(a)(12) (2010). 
288 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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the Second Amendment right, as articulated in Heller and its 
progeny, is appropriately considered under traditional 
constitutional scrutiny. 
“Scrutiny” describes a framework for evaluating a law or 
regulation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The highest level 
of scrutiny is “strict scrutiny,” which burdens the government 
with proving the necessity of the challenged law.  “Strict 
scrutiny” is generally the applicable test where a fundamental 
right or liberty interest is at stake.289  Most other interests are 
subject to the lowest level of scrutiny, “rational basis,” which 
presumes constitutionality.  Between “strict scrutiny” and 
“rational basis” are the heightened standards of “intermediate 
scrutiny” and “undue burden.” 
The level of scrutiny to which gun control laws are subjected 
is directly related to the degree of infringement on the right and 
the extent of judicial deference due to legislative bodies.  At 
minimum, the basis for any governmental infringement on an 
individual right is a rational relationship between the regulation 
at issue and the interest to be protected.  Under any form of 
heightened scrutiny, the legislative basis for encroaching on a 
right must be more precise.  The following discussion analyzes 
the constitutionality of a PHA rule banning all firearms in public 
housing under each of the varying tiers of scrutiny given Second 
Amendment incorporation. 
a. Rational Basis 
Almost all laws are subject to “rational basis” and almost all 
laws will survive challenge because there only needs to be a 
rational relationship between a legitimate government interest 
and the law or policy at issue.290  Indeed, unsupported 
speculation is sufficient to uphold a law unless it can be proven 
irrational.291  In Heller, the Court noted “rational basis” is 
inappropriate to evaluate an enumerated right.  The Court 
further stated:  “If all that was required to overcome the right to 
 
289 See Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second 
Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 197, 
242 (2009); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 227, 233 (2006) (“All incorporated rights may be fundamental, 
but not all incorporated rights trigger strict scrutiny.”). 
290 See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001). 
291 See id.; United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (W.D. Tenn. 
2009) (citing TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
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keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions 
on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”292  That said, the 
Court indicated that even under a “rational basis” analysis, a 
home handgun ban would not be constitutional.293  Heller has the 
effect of excluding “rational basis” as a potential standard by 
which to measure gun control laws, and as such, this standard 
will not be considered further. 
b. Strict Scrutiny 
The Bill of Rights, as incorporated to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, encompasses the types of fundamental 
and liberty interests “strict scrutiny” is designed to protect.  
Under “strict scrutiny” analysis, the government’s interest must 
be compelling and the means to achieve it must be narrowly 
tailored.294  In considering whether a law or policy is narrowly 
tailored, a court will consider the breadth of the challenged law.  
Put differently, a court will determine if the burden placed on the 
right is the “least restrictive alternative” for realizing the 
governmental objective; the restriction may neither be over nor 
underinclusive.295 
The Heller Court, in dicta, stated its ruling should not be 
construed to “cast doubt” on laws such as those prohibiting felons 
from possessing firearms.296  It is dubious that policy-oriented 
gun laws, such as those referenced in Heller, would meet the 
narrow tailoring requirement of “strict scrutiny.”  For one, felon-
in-possession laws are likely overbroad because there is no 
differentiation between violent and nonviolent offenders, as no 
threat from the individual is required.297  Implicit in this analysis 
is the understanding that “strict scrutiny” is an improper basis 
for Second Amendment review, and by extension, “strict 
scrutiny” is not the proper basis to evaluate a public housing 
firearm ban. 
 
292 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 n.27 (2008). 
293 Id. at 2817–18. 
294 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). 
295 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800–01 (2006). 
296 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. 
297 Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About 
Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1429 (2009). 
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c. Intermediate Scrutiny  
While “strict scrutiny” applies when First Amendment rights 
central to democracy are threatened, a lesser degree of scrutiny, 
known as “intermediate scrutiny,” applies to neutral restrictions 
that impose only incidental burdens.298  This jurisprudence has 
potential application in the Second Amendment context, and it 
appears this is a standard some courts have begun looking 
toward in the wake of the Heller and McDonald decisions.299 
The speculative relationship between a government interest 
and the means to achieve it that is permitted under “rational 
basis” review is not sufficient to satisfy “intermediate scrutiny”; 
nor is the narrow tailoring of “strict scrutiny” required.  Rather, 
“intermediate scrutiny” demands “factual justification to connect 
th[e] [government’s] rationale with the regulation in issue.”300  To 
survive challenge, a law must be substantially related to an 
important governmental interest without excessively burdening 
the right at stake.301  Although this standard is easily stated, it is 
difficult to apply. 
Concrete proof linking the government’s regulation to the 
right burdened is an indispensible requirement, but the quantum 
of evidence necessary to establish a substantial relation under 
“intermediate scrutiny” is not a precise formulation.  Justice 
Scalia once lamented that not only is there “no established 
criterion[,] . . . but [the Court] essentially appl[ies] [intermediate 
scrutiny] when it seems like a good idea to load the dice.”302  
Nonetheless, this standard has the potential to adequately 
insulate the right to bear arms from government intrusion, while 
sanctioning the enforcement of important policy objectives, such 
as keeping firearms out of the hands of convicted felons.   
PHAs have a right, by virtue of ownership and management 
responsibility, to regulate the premises of housing developments 
within their control.303  However, the government as proprietor 
 
298 United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (W.D. Tenn. 2009); see 
also Klukowski, supra note 289, at 235–36. 
299 See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 219, at 3. 
300 Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 311 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
301 Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213–14 (1997) (discussing 
intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment). 
302 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
303 Cf. United States v. Dorosan, 350 F. App’x 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a 
firearms ban on U.S. Postal Service property), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010).  
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argument alone will not satisfy heightened scrutiny.  Even in 
conjunction with an assertion of governmental police power as a 
basis for firearm regulation, “intermediate scrutiny” is not yet 
met.  Unlike “rational basis” review, there must be evidence to 
support the burden on an individual right.   
Under “intermediate scrutiny,” when crime prevention is the 
motive, “a law need not solve the crime problem . . . .  Some 
deterrence of serious criminal activity is more than enough.”304  
For example, statistical and anecdotal evidence of high instances 
of gun related crime in public housing, supports a government 
interest in banning firearms.  Evidence suggests gun-related 
violence is higher in public housing developments than in 
surrounding areas.305  A survey of PHAs with gun bans currently 
in place could provide anecdotal evidence, speaking to the local 
conditions and positive results of a ban over time.  For instance, 
the PHA in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which has had a ban in 
place for over a decade, claims the majority of residents support 
the ban and alert police to firearms on the premises.306  National 
statistics further indicate, in addition to intentional gun-related 
crime, firearms are responsible for a high number of accidental or 
unintentional firearm injuries and deaths.307  However, 
“intermediate scrutiny” requires a nexus—evidence linking 
firearm bans to a reduction in gun-related violence, such as facts 
showing that where there are fewer legal guns, there are fewer 
gun-related deaths and crimes.308 
Although it cannot be credibly claimed that there is no 
governmental interest in reducing crime and violence, 
particularly because public housing is government-owned, there 
is voluminous evidence rejecting the effectiveness of gun bans.  
For instance, the same Cuyahoga County PHA advocating the 
benefits of its long-standing gun ban stated that within a one to 
two month period, the police confiscated more than ten firearms 
from its developments.309  While there are no comparative facts 
 
304 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
179–80 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
305 See IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 14. 
306 Mentrek, supra note 160. 
307 IN THE CROSSFIRE, supra note 79, at 20. 
308 See, e.g., Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, Guns in the Home: 
Overview, http://www.bradycampaign.org/facts/gunviolence/gunsinthehome (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
309 Mentrek, supra note 160. 
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indicating the number of guns in Cuyahoga public housing before 
the ban, it is plain that the all out prohibition may not be 
effective.  Nor can public housing clearly be distinguished as 
posing a heightened risk; the Council of Large Public Housing 
Authorities discredited the HUD study establishing this fact.310  
Further, national statistics on the benefits of gun control differ 
substantially, and the correlation between gun control and 
firearm-related violence in public housing developments is, at 
best, tenuous.311  In fact, “[m]any housing authorities claim that 
non-residents are responsible for most of the drug trafficking and 
violent crime in their facilities.”312  By all appearances, the 
evidence fails to establish the requisite substantial factual 
relationship.  Even if gun-violence is a national problem, the 
facts do not prove that reducing the number of legal guns 
furthers the government interest in reducing firearm violence in 
public housing developments.313  In sum, evidence speaking to the 
benefits of banning legal firearm possession in public housing is 
inconclusive. 
Further, banning residents who are innocent of wrongdoing 
from possessing legal firearms in their homes denies a right that, 
if not fundamental, is of “supreme importance.”314  Denial of such 
an important individual right arguably has no substantial 
relationship to reducing illegal guns and, given the inconclusive 
evidence on the benefits of gun control, is seemingly ineffectual 
against criminal gun violence.  Due to the tenuous factual basis 
supporting legal firearm bans, it is unlikely such a regulation 
would withstand “intermediate scrutiny.” 
d. Undue Burden 
There is another tier of legal scrutiny that does not fit within 
the traditional fundamental rights structure.  This standard 
seeks to determine if a regulation places an “undue burden” on 
the exercise of a right.  A burden may be “undue” if it is  
 
 
310 See Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auths., supra note 80. 
311 Hicks, supra note 175, at 153–54. 
312 Id. at 154 (emphasis added). 
313 Id. at 153–54. 
314 Cf. Plyler v. Doe (Plyler II), 457 U.S. 202, 221, 223, 228 (1982) (using 
heightened scrutiny to invalidate a law requiring children of illegal aliens to pay 
tuition to attend public school; education is a nonfundamental right of great 
importance to the nation). 
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exceedingly severe or lacks a legitimate and rational 
justification.315  The “undue burden” test developed in relation to 
abortion.316   
Abortion may be the right most analogous to the right to 
bear arms.  Abortion has never been defined as a “fundamental” 
right, and the Supreme Court has been clear that what right does 
exist is not unqualified.317  Similarly, Heller is conspicuously 
silent as to fundamentality and is explicitly clear that the right 
to bear arms is not absolute.318  In addition, both abortion and the 
right to self-defense inherent in the Second Amendment, 
implicate an entitlement to bodily integrity. 
Further, the abortion right is considered sui generis because 
it is not easily “fitted into the conventional mosaic of 
constitutional analysis.”319  Abortion stands alone under the 
constitutional constructs because, ideology aside, the government 
has a significant interest in preventing the destruction of life, 
such that it rivals the protected individual privacy interest.320  A 
parallel may be drawn to the right to bear arms:  It is “sui generis 
in that it carries the inherent power to take life; firearms are 
unavoidably dangerous; guns can kill.”321  Abortion and gun 
control both implicate a dual governmental interest in protecting 
an individual liberty and preservation of human life.322   
The “undue burden” test allows for government infringement 
on a protected interest, so long as it does not present a 
“substantial obstacle” to exercise of the right.323  This standard of 
scrutiny is the most malleable.324  Unlike the other levels of 
heightened scrutiny, “undue burden” does not require a quantum 
of evidence to support the law but rather a sufficiently forceful 
 
315 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
920 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
316 See id. at 874 (majority opinion). 
317 See id. at 874–75 (citations omitted). 
318 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008). 
319 San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973). 
320 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.  
321 Klukowski, supra note 289, at 236–37 (emphasis added); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 852 (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences.”). 
322 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 875–76 (“Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of 
the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest[s] in preserving and protecting the 
health of the pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life.’ ” 
(alterations in original) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973))). 
323 Id. at 846, 877. 
324 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010) 
1046 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:995   
government interest in preservation of life.325  The right can also 
be more narrowly defined under this standard, such as how a 
woman’s right to abortion exists only up until fetal viability—
there is a tipping point where the state’s interest in preservation 
of life outweighs the individual liberty interest.326 
Arguably, this standard is well-suited to uphold many policy-
oriented gun control laws, such as prohibiting machinegun 
possession, banning weapons from sensitive places, or denying 
firearms to felons.  Prohibitions on machineguns, which are 
unusually dangerous to human life, would not place a substantial 
obstacle in the way of a law-abiding individual’s use of other 
firearms for home self-defense purposes.  Prohibiting firearms in 
sensitive places would not unduly burden the right to home self-
defense by excluding dangerous weapons from finite public 
spaces.  Nor would there be an “undue burden” on felons, because 
the government interest is sufficiently forceful to prevent felons 
from possessing firearms until a time when their rights are 
restored or the risk to society is effectively reduced. 327  In this 
circumstance, there is a tipping point converse to that of abortion 
because the risk to human life decreases over time. 
Nonetheless, a public housing firearm ban would likely fail 
under an “undue burden” analysis.  The ban would prohibit law-
abiding citizens from possessing legal firearms in their homes at 
all times, in a nontemporary situation.  Such a ban would be 
“profoundly unfair in its application to particular individuals, or 
so restrictive as to nullify, destroy, or render nugatory the 
underlying right to bear arms.”328  There simply is no plausible 
argument to explain how a complete denial does not amount to a 
severe and substantial obstacle—an “undue burden”—on the 
exercise of the Second Amendment right.  Further, the rationale 
underlying the “undue burden” test is arguably no more than an 
interest-balancing approach, which Heller explicitly rejects.329   
 
325 Casey, 505 U.S. at 869 (majority opinion). 
326 See id. at 846. 
327 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 61-7-7 (2010) (permitting felons to petition for 
reinstatement of right to possess firearms); Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 
2009) (finding a felon-in-possession statute unconstitutional as applied to 
rehabilitated nonviolent felon). 
328 Winkler, supra note 248, at 609. 
329 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008). 
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e. Sui Generis 
There is an alternate application of the sui generis 
classification, unrelated to abortion and the “undue burden” test.  
In addition to being an appropriate descriptor for a unique right 
or interest, the phrase sui generis is also applicable to an object 
or factual scenario that is wholly unique, such as searches by 
drug-sniffing dogs and ownership of human tissue.330  Application 
of a sui generis classification can serve to bolster important 
policy objectives.331 
One court suggested PHAs are sui generis based on the 
amalgamation of governmental influence—federal, state, and 
municipal.332  In the same vein, public housing developments are 
primed for a sui generis classification.  Public housing 
developments are low-income residential facilities, which provide 
a governmental benefit categorized as a property right, under the 
management and operation of a federally-subsidized state 
government landlord.333  There is no parity between public 
housing developments and any other type of facility given the 
affordable housing goals and government ownership of 
residential property.  Even other HUD-subsidized housing 
projects are not an appropriate analog because they are 
privately-owned.334  Based on these considerations, public 
housing developments are arguably sui generis.  
Sui generis implies an exception from common law 
constitutional scrutiny.  If viable, classifying public housing 
developments as sui generis would enable the courts to 
contemplate the complexities of public housing developments 
without influencing future Second Amendment jurisprudence.  
These complexities include, but are not limited to: (1) a 
governmental interest in preservation of the facilities as an 
affordable housing tool; (2) a landlord’s right to control its own 
property; (3) the exertion of state police power to control crime; 
 
330 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (canine sniff by 
narcotics-detection dog); Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 
1990) (human biologicals). 
331 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 489. 
332 Hous. Auth. of Asbury Park v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (D.N.J. 
1972) (citations omitted). 
333 See supra Part I.A. 
334 See U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Rental Assistance, 
http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/topics/rental_assistance (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010). 
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(4) gun-related crime problems specific to public housing; 
(5) liberties inherent to residential premises; (6) and the property 
interest tenants have in occupancy as appended to automatic 
lease renewals.  Generally, a sui generis classification is applied 
to uphold a policy-oriented law.  Therefore, if applied to public 
housing, firearm bans would almost certainly be upheld based on 
a unique fact-based examination.   
3. Equal Protection Challenges 
There is also a potential Equal Protection challenge to public 
housing firearms bans under the Fourteenth Amendment or a 
parallel state provision.  Equal Protection prohibits the 
government from treating similarly situated persons differently 
where a fundamental right or immutable characteristic is 
involved.335  Cases involving a “suspect class” or a “fundamental 
right” invoke heightened scrutiny.336  However, most 
government-created class distinctions do not touch upon 
immutable characteristics.  For class distinctions that do not 
trigger “strict scrutiny” to be constitutional, the only 
requirements are a rational basis and the absence of arbitrary or 
invidious discrimination.337  
At present, nonsuspect class distinctions exist in public 
housing.  For instance, “low-income” is a valid government-
created class distinction, which is used as the primary criterion 
for public housing occupancy.338  Economic disadvantage or 
indigence does not, in and of itself, establish a “suspect class.”339  
Nonetheless, when PHAs impose regulations, the concern is that, 
by virtue of living in government-owned or government-
subsidized housing, residents are being treated differently than 
those persons similarly situated. 
In challenging a firearms ban, public housing residents may 
assert a violation of Equal Protection, alleging discrimination 
premised on the right articulated in Heller, or a claim may be 
premised on a state right reflecting the same minimum 
 
335 16B GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW § 857 (2d ed. 2010). 
336 Id. 
337 See Hassan v. Wright, 45 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); 
Rasmussen v. Toia, 420 F. Supp. 757, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see 16B BLUM ET AL., 
supra note 335.  
338 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
339 Hassan, 45 F.3d at 1068. 
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protections.  The challenge would be based on a showing that 
similarly situated people, such as families not residing in public 
housing, are not being denied the right to bear arms.  Although 
poverty does not invoke a higher level of scrutiny under this 
analysis, and there is no fundamental right to government-
subsidized housing, there may be a “fundamental right” to legal 
firearm possession for home self-defense, which does invoke 
heightened scrutiny.340 
The low-income class distinction is not called upon to 
establish a “suspect class” but rather to show that because 
tenants cannot afford to live outside of public housing, they are 
being discriminated against in the exercise of a “fundamental 
right.”  If the courts decline to call the right to bear arms 
“fundamental,” the argument fails, and the challenge is relegated 
to a “rational basis” review.341  However, if the right is indeed 
“fundamental,” heightened scrutiny applies, the analysis tending 
to track Due Process.342  Given a “fundamental right” to bear 
arms, denying public housing residents the possession of legal 
firearms based on their inability to afford alternative housing is 
almost certainly enough to invalidate a gun ban under Equal 
Protection.343 
Additionally, there is a potential basis for an Equal 
Protection challenge premised on law enforcement officers 
residing in public housing.  HUD regulations explicitly provide 
for public housing occupancy by police officers to improve on-site 
security.344  The regulation implies, but does not state, that these 
officers would be permitted to possess firearms in their units.  
The intent of the regulation would be ill-served if the officers are 
unarmed.345  This scenario posits that all residents except police 
officer residents are prohibited from possessing firearms.  If 
“rational basis” review is applied, there is clearly a rational 
relationship between permitting law enforcement officers to 
possess firearms and the legitimate government interest in 
 
340 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2803, 2806–11 (2008). 
341 See 16B BLUM ET AL., supra note 335. 
342 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (indicating a convergence of 
Equal Protection and Due Process where a fundamental right is involved). 
343 Cf. id. (“The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out 
would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs.” (citing Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
344 24 C.F.R. § 960.505(b) (2010). 
345 See id. 
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increasing safety within public housing developments.  However, 
if the right to bear arms is considered “fundamental,” similarly 
situated persons—all public housing residents—would be treated 
differently in exercise of their fundamental right to bear arms.346  
If the ban is otherwise valid, this argument will likely fail a 
fundamental rights based Equal Protection challenge because 
police officers may be distinguished as not being similarly 
situated to traditional low-income public housing tenants. 
D. Legal Firearms in Public Housing: Additional 
Considerations 
If a lease provision banning firearms is invalidated as an 
unconstitutional exercise of state or federal power, or if Congress 
enacts an applicable statute or authorizes a HUD regulation 
permitting gun possession, there are additional issues to 
consider.  Although a complete ban would be invalid, PHAs 
would likely retain the authority to limit firearm types and to 
regulate on-site possession, so long as such restrictions do not 
impermissibly infringe on the right to bear arms.  These 
restrictions, as well as eviction policies, which generally give 
PHAs discretion to evict for criminal activity, must be 
reevaluated in light of a constitutional right to use a firearm in 
defense of self and home. 
1. Types of Firearms and Restrictions on Possession 
Both federal and state statutes restrict the types of firearms 
that may be possessed and the individuals who may lawfully 
possess those firearms. It then reasonably follows that PHAs 
could limit certain aspects of gun ownership on public housing 
property, even if an outright ban is impermissible.347  The issue is 
what types of firearms PHAs may prohibit and what restrictions 
on those firearms are valid.   
a. Restricted Types of Firearms 
The Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Miller348 
provides guidance as to the types of firearms public housing 
 
346 Cf. Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 914 N.E.2d 595, 606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (explaining 
that,  if there is no fundamental right, an assault weapons ban does not violate 
Equal Protection unless two assault weapons owners can show different treatment). 
347 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006); FLA. STAT. §§ 790.25(2), .221 (2010). 
348 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
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tenants may possess.  Miller, a case involving criminal interstate 
transportation of a short-barrel sawed-off shotgun, held that the 
Second Amendment does not protect firearms that do not bear 
“some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 
a well regulated militia.”349  The Heller Court read Miller to mean 
that “the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.”350  In discussing the limitations on types of firearms, 
the Heller Court noted that there is a “historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’ ” 
but also made clear that handguns are the “quintessential [home] 
self-defense weapon.”351  Therefore, PHAs would not be permitted 
to ban handguns, but highly dangerous or unusual weapons, such 
as machineguns and short-barrel shotguns, may be properly 
excluded from public housing units through specific lease 
provisions without substantial debate. 
b. Restrictions on Firearm Possession 
As to permissible firearm restrictions and regulations 
unrelated to the type of weapon, Heller was careful to note that 
an individual rights reading of the Second Amendment does not 
abrogate gun control laws prohibiting persons such as felons and 
the mentally-ill from possessing firearms.352  Subsequent to 
Heller, no federal court has held any of the federal prohibitions of 
this kind unconstitutional, drawing both on the dicta in Heller 
and the comparatively broad scope of the statute it struck 
down.353  Therefore, a lease provision requiring tenants to 
register firearms with the PHA may be a permissibly narrow gun 
 
349 Id. at 178. 
350 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815–16 (2008). 
351 Id. at 2817–18. 
352 Id. at 2816–17. 
353 See United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 598 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(“[I]t appears that every court which has considered a Second Amendment challenge 
to 18 U.S.C. § 922, post-Heller, has upheld the statute as constitutional.” (citing 
collected cases)), aff’d, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). But see United States v. Gieswein, 
No. 08-6113, 2009 WL 2837433, at *3 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We share the concern, 
expressed in the McCane concurrence, that the Heller dictum may be in tension with 
the basis for its own holding, as felon dispossession laws may not have the 
longstanding historical basis ascribed to them by the Court.” (citing United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring))), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1563 (2010). 
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regulation, presuming there is no arbitrary approval process.354  
Provisions preventing minors from possessing firearms and 
banning carriage of firearms in common areas are also 
presumptively constitutional.355  Prohibitions on felons and 
substance-abusers should, in theory, not be required because 
such tenants are screened out, but prohibitions on possession by 
the mentally-ill may have particular significance in facilities 
which cater to the disabled.  However, safe storage and trigger-
lock provisions may be unconstitutional because, in practice, 
such rules hinder a law-abiding tenant’s ability to engage in 
confrontation for purposes of immediate self-defense.356  
Restrictions must be viewed in light of the burden on the right to 
self-defense and in light of any existing distinctive state right.   
2. Use of a Firearm in Self-Defense 
The scope of the right articulated in Heller, and under a 
number of state constitutions, includes defense of one’s home, 
which implicitly allows for the brandishing or discharge of a 
firearm during confrontation.  However, some PHAs currently 
have leases prohibiting these very acts, without necessarily 
placing an outright ban on gun possession.357  The constitutional 
question considers tenant eviction under such a lease term, after 
a tenant’s legal, or allegedly legal, use of a firearm for self-
defense purposes.358  In this area, HUD regulations provide little 
guidance.  Relevantly, the regulations contemplate eviction from 
public housing for persons or family members engaged in 
“criminal activity that threatens the health, safety or right to 
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents.”359  
 
354 See McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(holding invalid a lease provision requiring advance registration and approval of 
overnight guests as an infringement on free association and privacy). 
355 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. 
356 See id. at 2864 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
357 See, e.g., Plattsburgh Hous. Auth., Dwelling Lease 12, 
http://www.phaplattsburgh.com/lease.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting 
“display[ing], discharg[ing] or threaten[ing] to display or discharge a firearm of any 
type”); City of Charlottesville, Rules of Occupancy, http://www.charlottesville.org/ 
Index.aspx?page=721 (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (prohibiting discharge of firearms). 
358 The scope of this Section focuses on public housing evictions for alleged 
criminal activity; for a general discussion of self-defense tort and criminal liability 
after Heller, see Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort 
and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second 
Amendment Musings, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1205 (2009).  
359 See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12) (2010). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 995 (2010) 
2010] FIREARMS IN PUBLIC HOUSING 1053 
Discharge of a firearm, in the absence of self-defense, would 
clearly fall within this lease provision, allowing for a proper 
eviction.  Given that gun-related crimes do occur in public 
housing developments, there is a possibility that tenants seeking 
to avoid rightful eviction will abuse the constitutional claim of 
armed self-defense.   
The procedural due process afforded in public housing 
evictions only guarantees notice and the opportunity to be 
heard,360 but it does not foreclose eviction for merely alleged 
criminal activity when that activity constitutes a lease 
violation.361  When tenants assert self-defense as grounds for use 
or discharge of a firearm, it may be necessary for PHAs to 
forestall eviction proceedings until law enforcement completes an 
investigation of the event or a criminal conviction is sustained 
against the tenant.  Very likely, eviction of a tenant claiming self-
defense, without proof as to the illegitimacy of the claim, is an 
unconstitutional infringement on the right articulated in Heller. 
Further, PHAs have a degree of discretion in evicting 
tenants because termination of occupancy is neither automatic 
nor mandatory, even where there is a clear lease violation.362  
Leaving this type of discretion in the hands of PHAs could raise 
the specter of arbitrariness or discrimination.  Therefore, if legal 
firearm possession is permitted in public housing, and HUD 
declines to promulgate a relevant regulation, it would be prudent 
for PHAs to establish a lease provision related to self-defense use 
of legal firearms and a baseline for grievance and eviction 
proceedings under that lease term. 
CONCLUSION 
Gun control laws are now subject to the constraints of 
Heller’s strong individual rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, as incorporated to the states through McDonald.  
The right to armed home self-defense articulated in Heller now 
serves as the baseline for future state right to bear arms 
decisions.  However, even though the Second Amendment is 
binding on the states, possession of legal firearms in public 
 
360 See Escalera v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861–62 (2d Cir. 1970). 
361 See 24 C.F.R. § 5.861. 
362 Scarborough v. Winn Residential L.L.P./Atlantic Terrace Apartments, 890 
A.2d 249, 257 (D.C. 2006) (citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 
125, 133–34 (2002)). 
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housing remains a murky issue.  The authority and interests of 
PHAs—as governmental actors imbued with state police power to 
control crime and as landlords with a proprietary entitlement to 
regulate their own property—are diametric to the rights of public 
housing tenants to possess firearms.  Important rights and 
interests are at stake on both sides of the issue, but there is little 
guiding jurisprudence.  There is no definitive answer as to the 
constitutionality of prohibiting legal firearms in public housing.  
All that exists are persuasive arguments supporting outright 
public housing firearm bans and equally persuasive arguments 
challenging the constitutional underpinnings of such regulations.   
When the interests of a PHA are pitted against those of 
public housing tenants, there are many potential outcomes.  A 
lease-based public housing firearm ban may be categorically 
rejected as an unconstitutional condition.  A ban may be upheld 
under constitutional scrutiny as a proper local gun control law, or 
it may be preempted by state law before ever reaching the 
constitutional issue.  A ban may be upheld premised on a sui 
generis classification or struck down as an Equal Protection 
violation of a fundamental right.  Lamentably, until a 
contemporary court encounters a meritorious challenge to public 
housing firearm bans, these possibilities are all merely studied 
speculation. 
Nationwide, federally-subsidized, PHA-owned public housing 
developments provide necessary shelter to low-income families 
who have few viable options for decent affordable housing.  For 
this reason, public housing is a small but vital component in 
federal housing policy that should be maintained as a vehicle to 
assist those in need.  Nonetheless, banning legal firearm 
possession in public housing enables government interference 
with otherwise legal gun ownership, strips residents of an 
important means of self-defense, and very likely “constitutes a 
ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal” gun-
related violent crime in public housing.363  Although there is 
 
363 Cf. Plyler II, 457 U.S. 202, 228–29 (1982) (quoting Doe v. Plyler (Plyler I), 458 
F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex. 1978)) (referring to a law charging tuition to the 
children of illegal aliens in an effort to reduce illegal immigration); accord Stefan B. 
Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 67, 88 (1991) 
(“Reducing gun ownership among law-abiding citizens will do almost nothing to 
reduce violent crime directly, since such behavior is virtually nonexistent among 
persons without previous records of serious violence and criminal behavior.”). Contra 
Ctr. for Gun Policy & Research, Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health, Johns Hopkins 
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almost certainly a right to legal firearm possession in public 
housing under Heller and McDonald, only future constitutional 
challenges will prove out the truth or falsity of this assertion. 
 
 
Univ., Fact Sheet: Stolen Guns, available at http://www.jhsph.edu/bin/c/q/guns_theft 
_fs.pdf (reporting that the 500,000 plus guns stolen from private citizens each year 
play a substantial role in arming criminals). 
